India and the World — UPSC PSIR Optional Notes

1. The Global South and South-South Cooperation

Global South: a political rather than strictly geographical term for developing countries; it replaced older terms like Third World after the Cold War.

South-South cooperation: exchange of resources, technology and knowledge among developing countries, as distinct from North-South aid with conditions.

Dependency theory: Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer argued that the terms of trade for primary commodities decline over time against manufactured goods, so the periphery stays poor; Andre Gunder Frank spoke of the development of underdevelopment.

World-systems theory: Immanuel Wallerstein divided the world economy into core, semi-periphery and periphery; India's demands for reform are often read through this lens.

India's development partnership model: grants, concessional lines of credit through the Exim Bank, capacity building through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme (ITEC, started 1964) and humanitarian aid.

Voice of the Global South Summits: India hosted three virtual summits (January 2023, November 2023 and August 2024) to carry developing countries' concerns on debt, food, energy and climate into the G20 and beyond.

2. India's Role in the Demand for NIEO

UNCTAD and G77 (1964): the UN Conference on Trade and Development, led first by Prebisch, and the Group of 77 developing countries were formed to press for fairer trade; India hosted UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 1968.

Declaration on the NIEO (1974): adopted by the UN General Assembly's sixth special session, with a Programme of Action; later that year the Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

Main demands: permanent sovereignty over natural resources, stable and fair commodity prices, preferential market access, transfer of technology, regulation of multinational corporations, debt relief and a greater voice in the IMF and World Bank.

India's role: India pushed these demands through NAM and G77 and stressed self-reliance and technology transfer; it also pressed for the Generalised System of Preferences, which developed countries introduced from the 1970s.

Why NIEO failed: the 1980s debt crisis, the rise of neoliberal policies in the US and UK, divisions between oil exporters and importers, and the end of the Cold War weakened the South's bargaining power; the Brandt Commission report (1980) on North-South relations was largely ignored.

Legacy: NIEO ideas live on in demands for reform of the IMF quota system, climate finance under common but differentiated responsibilities, and the New Development Bank of BRICS (agreed 2014).

3. India and the WTO Negotiations

Background: India was a founding member of GATT (1947) and of the WTO (1995), created by the Uruguay Round, which also brought in agreements on agriculture (AoA), intellectual property (TRIPS) and services (GATS).

Singapore issues (1996): India led developing countries in opposing new negotiations on investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation; only trade facilitation was eventually negotiated.

Doha Development Round (2001): launched with a promise to put development at the centre; the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health affirmed countries' right to protect public health, including through compulsory licences.

Cancún (2003): India and Brazil led the trade G20 of developing countries against the US-EU proposal on agriculture subsidies; the meeting collapsed but showed the South's new bargaining strength.

G33 and food security: India leads the G33 coalition seeking protection for poor farmers through special products and a special safeguard mechanism.

Public stockholding: India's minimum support price procurement can breach WTO subsidy limits calculated on 1986-88 prices; the Bali Ministerial (2013) gave an interim peace clause, which a 2014 General Council decision extended until a permanent solution is found.

TRIPS waiver (2020): India and South Africa proposed a waiver of intellectual property rules for COVID-19 vaccines and medicines; the Geneva Ministerial (2022) agreed only a limited decision on vaccine patents.

Current concerns: the Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019 because the US blocked appointments; India also resists plurilateral deals outside consensus (such as investment facilitation) and wants fisheries subsidy rules that protect small fishers.

Special and differential treatment: India insists developing countries keep this right; the US argues that large economies like India and China should not claim it.

4. India and Africa

Historical bonds: Gandhi's satyagraha in South Africa, India's support for African decolonisation and against apartheid, and the Indian diaspora in East and Southern Africa form the base.

India-Africa Forum Summits: held in New Delhi (2008), Addis Ababa (2011) and New Delhi (2015), the third attended by all 54 African countries; the fourth has been long delayed.

Kampala Principles (2018): in his address to Uganda's Parliament, Prime Minister Modi set out ten guiding principles, including partnership driven by African priorities, building local capacity and keeping the Indian Ocean open.

Instruments: lines of credit for railways, power and water projects, the Pan-African e-Network (2009) for tele-education and tele-medicine, its successors e-VidyaBharati and e-ArogyaBharati, ITEC scholarships, and duty-free access for least developed countries (2008).

Interests: energy (oil from Nigeria and Angola), minerals, markets for Indian pharmaceuticals and vehicles, UN votes, and maritime security with Indian Ocean states such as Mauritius, Seychelles, Mozambique and Kenya.

Island states: Mauritius and Seychelles are central to SAGAR; during a visit to Mauritius in March 2025 India widened the idea into MAHASAGAR, a Global South vision of security and growth across regions.

African Union in the G20 (2023): India's G20 presidency secured permanent membership for the African Union, India's strongest recent gesture to Africa.

China comparison: China's trade and loans in Africa are much larger; India presents its model as consultative, focused on skills and free of debt traps, though critics note slow project delivery.

Peacekeeping in Africa: most Indian peacekeepers have served in African missions such as those in Congo, South Sudan and earlier Somalia and Sierra Leone.

5. India and Latin America

Distance and neglect: geography and limited historical contact kept relations thin until the 1990s; trade rose after liberalisation.

Brazil: India's key partner in the region through BRICS, IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum, Brasilia Declaration 2003), the G4 for UN reform and coordination at the WTO and climate talks.

IBSA Fund (2004): India, Brazil and South Africa set up a fund, managed with the UN, for small poverty and hunger projects in other developing countries, an example of South-South cooperation by middle-income states.

Trade agreements: a Preferential Trade Agreement with Mercosur (signed 2004, in force 2009) and PTAs with Chile; India seeks to expand them.

Energy and minerals: crude oil from countries like Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, and lithium in the lithium triangle (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile), where Indian state firm KABIL has signed exploration agreements in Argentina.

Other links: pharmaceuticals, IT services, vehicles, and growing exports of Indian vaccines during the pandemic; India engages regional groups like CELAC and SICA.

6. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: define the Global South or NIEO, give India's role with two dated events, and connect to a present example (G20 and the African Union, the TRIPS waiver).

20-mark answer: start with dependency theory, trace the NIEO to the WTO, analyse India's coalitions (G20 trade group, G33, India-South Africa), discuss the tension between India's leadership claims and its own rising-power interests, and conclude with Voice of the Global South.

Keywords: South-South cooperation, terms of trade, special and differential treatment, public stockholding, peace clause, demand-driven partnership.

Critical angle: some argue India now behaves like an emerging power seeking a seat at the top table (G20, Quad) rather than a voice of the poor, while India answers that it can bridge North and South.

1. Cold War: Estranged Democracies

Estranged democracies: Dennis Kux used this phrase as the title of his history of India-US relations from 1941 to 1991, capturing how two democracies stayed apart for half a century.

Divergence: the US saw non-alignment as leaning to Moscow, and allied with Pakistan through SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955), arming India's rival.

Cooperation in parts: US food aid under PL-480, support for the Green Revolution and help during the 1962 war showed that the relationship was never wholly hostile.

1971 low point: the Nixon-Kissinger tilt towards Pakistan and the sending of the USS Enterprise carrier group into the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh war pushed India towards the 1971 Treaty with the USSR.

Nuclear sanctions: after India's 1974 test the US passed non-proliferation laws and cut nuclear fuel supply for the Tarapur reactors, beginning three decades of technology denial.

After 1991: economic reform, the end of the Soviet Union and a growing Indian-American community opened the way for engagement, though Kashmir and non-proliferation remained irritants.

1998 tests and dialogue: the US imposed sanctions after Pokhran-II, but the long Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott dialogue that followed built trust; President Clinton's visit in March 2000 marked a new start.

2. The Civil Nuclear Deal and Strategic Convergence

Kargil (1999): US pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its forces convinced many in India that Washington's approach had changed.

Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004): cooperation in civil nuclear, space, high-technology trade and missile defence.

18 July 2005 Joint Statement: Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush agreed that the US would work for full civil nuclear cooperation with India, and India would separate civilian and military facilities and place civilian ones under IAEA safeguards.

Steps to completion: the US Hyde Act (2006), the 123 Agreement, an India-specific IAEA safeguards agreement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver (September 2008) completed the deal.

Domestic cost: the Left parties withdrew support from the UPA government in July 2008 over the deal, which survived a confidence vote, showing how contested closeness to the US was in India.

Significance: the deal ended India's nuclear isolation and accepted it as a responsible nuclear power without signing the NPT, although few US reactors have been built, partly because of India's Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.

3. Defence and Security Partnership

Framework agreements: a ten-year defence framework signed in 2005 and renewed in 2015.

Foundational agreements: GSOMIA (2002) on military information, LEMOA (2016) on logistics, COMCASA (2018) on secure communications and BECA (2020) on geospatial intelligence.

Status upgrades: the US named India a Major Defence Partner in 2016 and gave it Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 status in 2018, easing export of sensitive technology.

Equipment: India now operates US-origin aircraft such as the C-17, C-130J and P-8I, and Apache and Chinook helicopters; GE-HAL co-production of F414 jet engines was agreed in 2023.

Dialogues and exercises: the 2+2 ministerial dialogue since 2018, and exercises such as Malabar (naval), Yudh Abhyas (army) and Cope India (air force).

Quad and Indo-Pacific: both countries back a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific; the Quad was revived in 2017 and held its first leaders' summit in 2021, while India insists it is not a military alliance.

4. Economy, Technology and People

Trade: the US is one of India's largest trading partners and a top export market, with India running a surplus in goods trade, a point of US concern.

Critical and emerging technology: the iCET initiative (launched 2023) covered semiconductors, AI, quantum, space and defence innovation; in 2025 it was relaunched as the TRUST initiative.

Space: India signed the US-led Artemis Accords in 2023, and NASA and ISRO jointly built the NISAR earth observation satellite.

Diaspora: the Indian-American community is among the most prosperous and politically visible in the US, and supported the nuclear deal in Congress; Indian students form one of the largest foreign student groups there.

Mission 500: in February 2025 the two leaders set a goal of raising bilateral trade to 500 billion US dollars by 2030 and agreed to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement.

5. Frictions and Debates

Trade disputes: the US withdrew India's Generalised System of Preferences benefits in 2019, and tariffs on Indian goods have been a recurring source of tension, especially in President Trump's terms.

Russia factor: India's purchase of the S-400 system risked sanctions under the US law CAATSA, and India's refusal to condemn Russia over Ukraine and its oil purchases have drawn US criticism.

Immigration: H-1B visa rules and deportation of undocumented Indians affect a key constituency.

Values and internal affairs: US reports on religious freedom and human rights, and Indian objections to what it sees as interference, are periodic irritants.

Pakistan and Afghanistan: US engagement with Pakistan, and the 2020 Doha deal with the Taliban that excluded India, showed that US and Indian interests do not always match.

Ally or partner: the US would like India to act more like an ally against China; India prefers a partnership that keeps its strategic autonomy, which some Americans see as free-riding.

Reliability doubts: Indian sceptics point to sudden US policy shifts, sanctions history and tariff threats as reasons not to depend too much on Washington.

Asymmetry of expectations: Ashley Tellis has argued that the US bet on India was meant to build Indian power as a counterweight to China rather than to win immediate support on every issue (paraphrased).

6. Theoretical Lenses

Realism: balance of power explains convergence; both countries see China as the main challenge, as Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat idea would predict.

Liberalism: shared democracy, trade, technology and the diaspora create interdependence and trust beyond security.

Constructivism: the shift from estranged to natural partners shows how identities and narratives changed; Prime Minister Vajpayee described the two countries as natural allies in 1998.

Hedging: India's approach of deepening ties with the US while keeping Russia and engaging China is described by scholars as hedging, not bandwagoning.

7. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: two lines on the Cold War gap, the nuclear deal as turning point, three pillars of today's partnership (defence, technology, Indo-Pacific) and one friction.

20-mark answer: structure by phases (estrangement, engagement, partnership), then drivers of convergence, areas of divergence, a theoretical reading and a conclusion on strategic autonomy within partnership.

Keywords: estranged democracies, natural allies, 123 Agreement, foundational agreements, Major Defence Partner, hedging, strategic autonomy.

Usable line: in his 2016 address to the US Congress, Modi said the two countries had overcome the hesitations of history; President Obama earlier called the relationship one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century (both paraphrased).

Caution: trade negotiations and tariffs change fast; write about their lasting significance (market access, strategic trust) rather than the latest numbers.

1. India and the EU: Evolution

Early ties: India was among the first countries to establish relations with the European Economic Community, in 1962.

Cooperation Agreement (1994): widened ties beyond trade and aid to political dialogue.

Summits and Strategic Partnership: annual summits began in 2000 (Lisbon), and the relationship became a Strategic Partnership in 2004, with a Joint Action Plan in 2005.

Stalled decade: talks on a Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement began in 2007 but were suspended in 2013 over issues such as tariffs on cars and wines, data security status, services mobility and intellectual property; no summit was held between 2012 and 2016.

Revival: the EU-India Strategic Partnership Roadmap to 2025 (2020) and the Leaders' Meeting at Porto (May 2021), where free trade talks were relaunched along with separate investment protection and geographical indications agreements.

Why the revival: China's assertiveness, the pandemic's supply chain shocks and the EU's own Indo-Pacific strategy (2021) made India more important to Europe.

2. India and the EU: Current Agenda

Trade and Technology Council (2022): announced in April 2022, it was only the second such council the EU had set up, after the one with the US, covering digital governance, clean technology and supply chains.

Connectivity Partnership (2021): a commitment to sustainable connectivity projects in India and third countries, linked with the EU's Global Gateway.

IMEC: the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, plans to link India to Europe through the Gulf by sea, rail and digital links.

Commission visit (February 2025): the entire EU College of Commissioners visited New Delhi, and both sides agreed to aim to conclude the free trade agreement by the end of 2025.

Climate and energy: cooperation in green hydrogen, solar energy (the EU and members back the International Solar Alliance) and clean energy partnerships.

Member states: much of India's real engagement is bilateral, especially with France (strategic partnership since 1998, Rafale aircraft, Scorpene submarines, civil nuclear and space cooperation) and Germany (technology, green partnership, skilled migration).

Security dialogue: maritime security and counter-piracy cooperation in the western Indian Ocean, and joint naval exercises.

3. India and the EU: Frictions

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: the EU's levy on carbon-intensive imports such as steel and aluminium is seen by India as a unilateral trade barrier that conflicts with common but differentiated responsibilities.

Values agenda: European Parliament resolutions on human rights or internal matters are rejected by India as interference.

Russia and Ukraine: Europe wanted India to take a tougher line on Russia, while India pointed out that Europe itself continued buying Russian energy for some time.

Bureaucratic distance: the EU is a complex actor, and India has often found it easier to deal with member states than with Brussels.

4. India and Japan: Evolution

Civilisational links: Buddhism, and in modern times figures such as Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Kakuzo, and Subhas Chandra Bose's alliance with Japan during the Second World War.

Justice Radhabinod Pal: the Indian judge at the Tokyo war crimes tribunal wrote a dissent holding all the accused not guilty, which is remembered warmly in Japan.

Peace Treaty (1952): India did not attend the San Francisco conference and signed a separate peace treaty with Japan, waiving war reparations.

Aid partner: India received Japan's first yen loan in 1958 and has for many years been among the largest recipients of Japanese official development assistance; Japan helped build the Delhi Metro.

Setback and recovery: Japan imposed sanctions after the 1998 nuclear tests, but Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit in 2000 launched a Global Partnership, raised to a Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006.

5. India and Japan: The Special Partnership

Confluence of the Two Seas: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 2007 speech to the Indian Parliament described the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single sphere, an early statement of the Indo-Pacific idea.

Special Strategic and Global Partnership (2014): agreed during Modi's visit to Tokyo, with a Japanese pledge of large public and private investment.

Economic agreements: a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (2011); in 2022 Japan set a target of 5 trillion yen of public and private investment in India over five years.

Civil nuclear agreement (2016): signed in November 2016, a major step since Japan, the only country to suffer atomic bombings, had never signed such a deal with a non-NPT state.

Infrastructure: the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail using Shinkansen technology, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor and Dedicated Freight Corridor, and Northeast projects through the Act East Forum.

Defence and security: a 2+2 ministerial dialogue (from 2019), an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (2020) for logistics, and exercises such as JIMEX (navy), Dharma Guardian (army) and Malabar.

Indo-Pacific and Quad: both are Quad members; Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative overlap closely.

Supply chains: India, Japan and Australia launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative in 2021 to reduce dependence on China; Japan has also supported Indian semiconductor plans.

Third-country cooperation: the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (2017) and joint projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar offered an alternative to China's Belt and Road.

6. Debates and Analysis

Limits with Japan: trade remains modest relative to potential, the CEPA has favoured Japan in trade balance, and the bullet train project has faced land and cost delays.

Japan's China dilemma: Japan has deep economic ties with China, so it balances security cooperation with India against economic interests.

EU as a normative power: Ian Manners described the EU as a normative power that spreads values such as democracy and human rights; India welcomes shared values but resists conditionality.

Multipolar logic: both partners matter to India's vision of a multipolar world and multipolar Asia, providing capital, technology and markets without the dependency risks of China or the political strings of a formal alliance.

7. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer on the EU: one line on the 2004 partnership, the stalled and relaunched FTA, TTC and IMEC, and frictions like CBAM.

10-mark answer on Japan: the 2014 partnership, the 2016 nuclear deal, infrastructure (high-speed rail, Northeast), defence agreements and the Indo-Pacific.

20-mark answer: place both in India's search for a multipolar order, compare drivers (economic for the EU, strategic and economic for Japan), list achievements and limits, and conclude with their role in reducing dependence on China.

Keywords: strategic partnership, BTIA, Trade and Technology Council, CBAM, Special Strategic and Global Partnership, Confluence of the Two Seas, Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion of talks: India and the EU concluded the FTA negotiations in early 2026, with signing expected by December 2026; it would give duty-free access to about 93% of India's exports to the EU by value, while the EU's carbon border tax (CBAM) remains a sensitive issue.

1. History: From Panchsheel to 1962

Recognition: India recognised the People's Republic of China at the end of December 1949, among the first non-communist states to do so, and established diplomatic relations on 1 April 1950.

Tibet: China's takeover of Tibet in 1950 removed the buffer between the two; in the 1954 Agreement India accepted Tibet as a region of China.

Panchsheel (1954): the five principles of peaceful coexistence were written into the agreement on trade and intercourse with the Tibet region; the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai expressed the hope of the time.

Rising tension: China built a road through Aksai Chin in the 1950s, the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959, and Nehru's forward policy placed posts in disputed areas.

1962 war: China attacked in October 1962 in Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency, then declared a unilateral ceasefire in November and withdrew in the east while holding Aksai Chin.

Lessons: the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report examined the military failures; the defeat led to a large defence build-up and ended the idealist phase of Indian policy.

1967 Nathu La and Cho La: clashes in Sikkim in which Indian forces held their ground, often cited as showing the 1962 outcome was not fixed.

Long quiet border: after an ambush at Tulung La in Arunachal Pradesh in 1975, no soldier died in clashes on the border for 45 years until Galwan.

2. The Boundary Question

Three sectors: western (Aksai Chin, held by China, claimed by India), middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, smallest dispute) and eastern (Arunachal Pradesh, held by India, claimed by China as South Tibet).

McMahon Line: drawn at the Simla Conference of 1914 between British India and Tibet; China rejects it, saying Tibet had no power to sign treaties.

Line of Actual Control: the de facto line, never jointly defined on maps, which is why patrols of both sides overlap and face-offs happen.

Normalisation: ambassadors were restored in 1976, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, and the two agreed to develop relations while seeking a boundary settlement.

Border agreements: the 1993 Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC, the 1996 military confidence-building measures (including not opening fire near the LAC), the 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles, and the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Special Representatives (2003): set up after Vajpayee's visit to Beijing to seek a political settlement; India's NSA is its representative.

Face-offs: Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017, at the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction) showed growing Chinese pressure; informal summits at Wuhan (2018) and Mamallapuram (2019) tried to restore trust.

Galwan (June 2020): during a standoff in eastern Ladakh, a clash in the Galwan valley killed 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers, the first deaths on the border since 1975.

2020 friction points: the standoff covered Galwan, the north and south banks of Pangong Tso, Gogra-Hot Springs, and the older problem areas of Depsang and Demchok; buffer zones created during disengagement limited patrolling by both sides.

Disengagement: after many rounds of military talks, disengagement took place at several friction points, and an October 2024 arrangement restored patrolling at Depsang and Demchok, followed by a Modi-Xi meeting at Kazan.

3. Economic Relations

Trade growth: China became one of India's largest trading partners, but India runs a very large and persistent trade deficit.

Dependence: Indian industry relies on Chinese electronics, active pharmaceutical ingredients, solar equipment and machinery, which is a strategic vulnerability.

Response after 2020: India banned many Chinese apps on security grounds, required government approval for investment from countries sharing a land border (Press Note 3 of 2020), and launched production-linked incentive schemes to build domestic manufacturing.

Multilateral cooperation: both are members of BRICS, the SCO and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (India is among its largest borrowers), and have at times coordinated on climate and WTO issues.

Debate: some economists argue for allowing selected Chinese investment to build supply chains in India, while security analysts warn against dependence.

4. Strategic Rivalry

China-Pakistan axis: Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes, arms supplies and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, are India's core objections.

Belt and Road Initiative: India has stayed out, objecting to CPEC on sovereignty grounds and to unsustainable debt, and did not attend the Belt and Road Forum of 2017.

Indian Ocean and neighbourhood: Chinese ports and loans in Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Pakistan (Gwadar), Myanmar and the Maldives, and a base in Djibouti, are seen in India as encirclement, often called the string of pearls.

Global forums: China blocked India's entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and for years blocked UN listing of Masood Azhar as a terrorist, which finally happened in May 2019; it does not support India's UNSC permanent membership.

Renaming places: China has several times issued its own names for places in Arunachal Pradesh and issues stapled visas to some residents; India rejects these as attempts to alter reality, stating Arunachal is an integral part of India.

Tibet and the Dalai Lama: the presence of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala, and the question of his succession, remain sensitive.

Water: China's dam building on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), including a very large project approved in late 2024 near the Indian border, worries India.

India's balancing: closer ties with the US, Japan, Australia and France, the Quad, Act East, military infrastructure along the LAC and naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

5. Theories and Thinkers

Security dilemma: each side's defensive steps (roads, troops, alliances) look threatening to the other, producing an arms and infrastructure race along the LAC.

John Garver: in Protracted Contest (2001) he described Sino-Indian rivalry as a long competition for influence in South Asia and Tibet, not just a border dispute.

Power transition: realists such as A. F. K. Organski predict tension when a rising power challenges an established order; India sees China seeking a unipolar Asia, while India wants a multipolar Asia.

Liberal puzzle: theories of complex interdependence (Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye) expect trade to reduce conflict, yet India-China trade grew alongside border tension, showing the limits of economic interdependence when sovereignty is at stake.

Indian views: Shivshankar Menon and S. Jaishankar argue that relations must rest on mutual respect, sensitivity and interest, and that peace on the border is the basis for normal ties elsewhere.

6. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: one line on 1954 and 1962, the boundary sectors, Galwan and the 2024 arrangement, and India's approach of managing rivalry.

20-mark answer: introduction with the cooperation-competition paradox, then history, boundary, economy, strategic competition (Pakistan, BRI, Indian Ocean), theory, and a conclusion on deterrence plus dialogue.

Keywords: Panchsheel, McMahon Line, LAC, security dilemma, string of pearls, CPEC, de-risking, multipolar Asia.

Usable idea: India's official position after 2020 has been that the state of the border will determine the state of the relationship (Jaishankar's repeated formulation, paraphrased).

Balance: mention areas of cooperation (BRICS, SCO, climate, trade) so the answer does not read as one-sided.

1. The Soviet Era

Slow start: Stalin viewed Nehru's India with suspicion as a Western-leaning state; relations warmed after his death in 1953.

1955 turning point: Nehru visited the USSR, and Khrushchev and Bulganin toured India, declaring Soviet support for India's position on Kashmir.

Vetoes for India: the USSR used its Security Council veto several times on Kashmir and in December 1971 to block resolutions that would have halted India's operations in East Pakistan.

Economic help: Soviet assistance built public sector plants such as the Bhilai Steel Plant (1959) and Bokaro, and trade was conducted in rupees, saving scarce foreign exchange.

Tashkent (1966): the USSR mediated the Tashkent Declaration between India and Pakistan after the 1965 war.

Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (August 1971): signed for 20 years, it provided for mutual consultation if either party was attacked or threatened; it deterred China and the US during the Bangladesh war.

Defence supplier: MiG aircraft, tanks and warships made the USSR India's main arms source, often with licensed production in India; India was cautious in criticising the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979).

2. Post-Soviet Reset

Drift in the 1990s: Boris Yeltsin's Russia looked West, the rupee-rouble debt had to be settled and spare parts supplies were disrupted.

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1993): replaced the 1971 treaty without its security clause.

Strategic Partnership (2000): signed during President Putin's visit in October 2000, with annual summits since then.

Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership (2010): the upgraded label reflects trust in sensitive areas such as nuclear submarines and missile technology.

Primakov's triangle: Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov proposed a Russia-India-China strategic triangle in 1998 to counter US unipolarity, the origin of the RIC format.

Multilateral links: Russia backed India's full membership of the SCO (2017) and supports India's claim to a permanent UNSC seat; both are in BRICS and the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral.

3. Pillars of the Partnership

Defence: Russia has been India's largest arms supplier for decades, though its share has fallen as India buys from the US, France and Israel and builds at home.

Joint production: the BrahMos cruise missile (joint venture of 1998), Su-30MKI fighters built by HAL, T-90 tanks, and AK-203 rifles made at Amethi.

Sensitive cooperation: the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, the lease of nuclear-powered submarines, and the S-400 air defence system (contract 2018) show a depth of trust few other partners offer.

Nuclear energy: Russia is building the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu, India's largest nuclear power project with foreign collaboration.

Energy: ONGC Videsh holds stakes in Sakhalin-1 and other Russian fields; after 2022 discounted Russian crude made Russia one of India's largest oil suppliers.

Space: Soviet help launched India's first satellite Aryabhata (1975) and took Rakesh Sharma to space (1984); Russia has helped train astronauts for India's Gaganyaan mission.

Connectivity: the International North-South Transport Corridor (agreement of 2000 with Iran and Russia) links Mumbai to Russia via Iran, and the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor links India to the Russian Far East.

Russian Far East and Arctic: at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in 2019, India announced a line of credit of one billion US dollars for the Russian Far East, and it is interested in Arctic energy and the Northern Sea Route.

Trade: trade was small for decades but rose sharply after 2022 because of oil, creating a large Indian deficit and payment problems under sanctions; the two have set a target of 100 billion US dollars by 2030.

4. The Ukraine War and India's Position

UN votes: India abstained on most resolutions condemning Russia in the Security Council, General Assembly and Human Rights Council, while stressing the UN Charter, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This is not an era of war: Prime Minister Modi told President Putin at the SCO summit in Samarkand in September 2022 that today's era is not of war; the line was echoed in the G20 Bali declaration.

Reasons for India's stance: dependence on Russian arms and spares, cheap energy for a developing economy, the need to keep Russia from depending wholly on China, and a long record of Russian support.

Balancing: India also sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and Prime Minister Modi visited Moscow in July 2024 and Kyiv in August 2024, presenting India as a possible voice for dialogue.

Symbolism: during the July 2024 visit, Russia conferred its highest state honour, the Order of St Andrew the Apostle, on Prime Minister Modi, underlining the political warmth of the relationship.

Western criticism: some Western governments said India's oil purchases helped finance the war; India replied that it was buying to meet its people's energy needs and that Europe had also bought Russian energy.

5. Challenges and Debates

Russia-China closeness: the no-limits partnership declared by Russia and China in February 2022 raises doubts about Russian support for India in a crisis with China.

Russia and Pakistan: limited Russian defence contacts with Pakistan and its role in the Afghan process worry India.

Delivery delays: sanctions and the war's demands on Russian industry have delayed spare parts and some deliveries, adding to India's push for self-reliance.

US pressure: CAATSA, secondary sanctions risks and US tariff threats over Russian oil complicate India's balancing act.

Thin economic base: unlike India-US ties, the relationship lacks large private business, people-to-people and diaspora links, so it depends heavily on governments and defence.

Realist reading: Russia is valuable to India as a source of military technology and a balancer that prevents a China-dominated Eurasia; liberal ties are weak, but strategic logic remains strong.

Strategic autonomy test: scholars widely treat India's Ukraine stance as the clearest recent example of strategic autonomy, though critics call it a costly hedge.

6. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: one line on the Soviet legacy (1971 treaty), the 2000 and 2010 partnerships, the defence-energy pillars and one current challenge.

20-mark answer: trace the relationship from Soviet times to the present, analyse the pillars, discuss the Ukraine war and the China factor, use realism to explain endurance, and conclude on the future of the partnership in a multipolar world.

Keywords: time-tested friend, Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership, strategic autonomy, INSTC, RIC, hedging.

Usable line: the phrase that this is not an era of war, from Modi's Samarkand meeting, shows India's position: friendship with Russia but no endorsement of war.

Caution: oil import shares change quickly; write that Russia became one of India's largest suppliers after 2022 rather than quoting exact percentages.

1. India and the UN System

Founding member: India signed the Declaration by United Nations in 1942 and the UN Charter in 1945 while still a British colony, one of the original 51 members.

Early causes: India raised the treatment of Indians in South Africa at the UN in 1946, the first step in the global campaign against apartheid; Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit became the first woman President of the General Assembly in 1953.

Kashmir reference (1948): India took the Kashmir issue to the Security Council in January 1948; the experience of Cold War politics there made India wary of third-party roles in Kashmir.

Norm-building: India helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Hansa Mehta pressed for the wording all human beings rather than all men), backed decolonisation (1960 Declaration) and pushed disarmament.

World Court: Indian judges have served on the International Court of Justice; in 2017 Justice Dalveer Bhandari was re-elected after the UK withdrew its candidate, the first time a permanent member lost a seat on the Court.

Development role: the India-UN Development Partnership Fund, set up in 2017 and managed by the UN Office for South-South Cooperation, funds small projects in other developing countries.

Liberal institutionalism: India's faith in the UN reflects the liberal view that institutions reduce uncertainty and give weaker states a voice, though Indian realists stress that the UN failed India on Kashmir and in 1962.

2. India's Role in UN Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping: not mentioned in the UN Charter; it developed as a middle path between Chapter VI (peaceful settlement) and Chapter VII (enforcement), based on consent, impartiality and minimum use of force.

Korea (1950-1953): India sent a medical unit (60th Parachute Field Ambulance) and chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission under General K. S. Thimayya, with an Indian Custodian Force handling prisoners of war.

Gaza and Sinai (UNEF I, 1956): Indian troops served in the first armed UN peacekeeping force after the Suez crisis.

Congo (1960-1964): a large Indian contingent served in ONUC; Captain Gurbachan Singh Salaria was awarded the Param Vir Chakra, the only one given for a UN mission.

Later missions: Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, the Golan Heights, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan, among many others.

Scale: India has sent well over two lakh personnel to around fifty missions over seven decades and has lost more peacekeepers than almost any other country.

Women in peacekeeping: India deployed the first all-female Formed Police Unit to Liberia in 2007, a model later praised by the UN.

Capacity building: the Centre for UN Peacekeeping in New Delhi trains Indian and foreign officers.

India's concerns: troop-contributing countries are not adequately consulted by the Security Council when mandates are written, mandates are often too ambitious for the resources given, and peacekeepers face growing attacks.

Responsibility to Protect: India supports protecting civilians but is cautious about force against sovereign states; it abstained on Resolution 1973 (2011), which authorised military action in Libya, and later criticised how it was used for regime change.

Resolution 2589 (2021): adopted during India's August 2021 presidency of the Council, it calls for accountability for crimes against peacekeepers.

Why India contributes: commitment to multilateralism, professional exposure for its army, a claim to great-power responsibility that supports its case for a permanent seat, and goodwill in Africa.

3. The Demand for a Permanent Seat

Non-permanent terms: India has been elected eight times: 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-92, 2011-12 and 2021-22; it lost the 1996 election to Japan.

India's case: population (the largest in the world), a large and growing economy, its record as a democracy, peacekeeping contributions, nuclear responsibility, and its role as a voice of the developing world.

Legitimacy argument: the Council's permanent membership reflects the victors of 1945; Africa and Latin America have no permanent member, and the UN membership has grown from 51 to 193.

Term priorities (2021-22): India's agenda centred on counter-terrorism, maritime security (an open debate chaired by Prime Minister Modi in August 2021), peacekeeping and reformed multilateralism; it chaired the Counter-Terrorism Committee in 2022.

Afghanistan resolution: Resolution 2593, adopted in August 2021 under India's presidency after the Taliban takeover, demanded that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter terrorists.

Supporters: the US, the UK, France and Russia have stated support for India's permanent membership, though their positions on the veto and the overall reform model differ.

4. Reform Process and Obstacles

Charter amendment (Article 108): needs a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members, so any one P5 member can block reform.

Only precedent: the Council was enlarged once, in 1965, from 11 to 15 members by adding non-permanent seats.

G4: India, Brazil, Germany and Japan back each other's bids; their 2005 framework resolution proposed six new permanent and four new non-permanent seats, with the new permanent members willing not to use the veto for an initial period.

Veto question: India holds that new permanent members should in principle have the same responsibilities and privileges as existing ones, including the veto, but has shown flexibility on deferring its use.

Uniting for Consensus: led by Italy and Pakistan with Argentina, Mexico, South Korea and others, it opposes new permanent members and proposes only longer-term non-permanent seats.

African position: the Ezulwini Consensus (2005) demands two permanent seats with veto and five non-permanent seats for Africa, which complicates a common reform text.

Intergovernmental Negotiations: talks in the General Assembly since 2009 have not produced a negotiating text with attributions, which India criticises as a process without progress.

China: the only permanent member not openly backing India; it supports reform only in general terms that favour developing countries' representation.

The 1950s offer debate: some writers claim Nehru turned down a US or Soviet suggestion that India take a permanent seat in place of the Republic of China; Nehru told Parliament in 1955 that no such offer was made, so present it only as a debated claim.

Critique of India's bid: sceptics argue that India's frequent abstentions and avoidance of hard choices weaken its claim; India replies that independent judgement is exactly what a reformed Council needs.

5. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer on peacekeeping: India's record (Korea, Congo, Liberia), scale, concerns about consultation and mandates, and link to the UNSC bid.

20-mark answer on the permanent seat: India's credentials, the legitimacy deficit of the Council, the reform models (G4, UfC, Africa), obstacles (Article 108, China) and a conclusion on reformed multilateralism and alternative forums like the G20.

15-mark variant: if asked only about peacekeeping, use the evolution from traditional to multidimensional and robust missions, India's concerns, and its push for consultation with troop contributors under the spirit of Article 44 of the Charter.

Keywords: reformed multilateralism, legitimacy deficit, troop-contributing countries, robust peacekeeping, G4, Uniting for Consensus, Ezulwini Consensus, IGN.

Usable idea: Indian leaders often ask how long India will be kept out of the decision-making structures of the UN (paraphrasing Modi's 2020 General Assembly address); pair it with the fact that India is home to about one-sixth of humanity.

Theory link: realists see the veto as a reflection of power that will not be given up voluntarily; liberals and constructivists stress legitimacy and representation as sources of UN authority.

1. Early Phase: Peaceful Use and Disarmament

Homi Bhabha: founded India's nuclear programme; the Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1948 and the Department of Atomic Energy in 1954.

Three-stage programme: Bhabha planned pressurised heavy water reactors, then fast breeder reactors, then thorium-based reactors, because India has limited uranium but large thorium reserves.

Nehru's disarmament diplomacy: in 1954, after US hydrogen bomb tests, Nehru called for a standstill agreement on nuclear testing, an early proposal that fed into the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which India signed.

Option open: Nehru opposed nuclear weapons but kept the scientific base that could make them, a policy later called keeping the option open.

China factor: China's nuclear test at Lop Nor in October 1964, two years after the 1962 war, created India's core security dilemma.

Seeking guarantees: India explored security guarantees from the nuclear powers in the mid-1960s but found none credible, which pushed it towards self-reliance.

2. NPT, 1974 and the CTBT

NPT (1968): recognised as nuclear-weapon states only those that had tested before 1 January 1967 (US, USSR, UK, France, China) and required all others to give up weapons.

India's objection: India called the NPT discriminatory because it divided the world into nuclear haves and have-nots, placed no binding timetable on the five to disarm, and legitimised China's weapons while denying India the option.

Smiling Buddha (18 May 1974): India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokhran under Indira Gandhi; it did not declare itself a weapons state.

Response: the Nuclear Suppliers Group was formed in 1975 largely in response, and three decades of technology denial followed.

Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (1988): presented at the UN General Assembly's third special session on disarmament, it proposed eliminating all nuclear weapons in stages by 2010; it was ignored by the nuclear powers.

Indefinite extension of the NPT (1995): made the discrimination permanent in India's view and increased pressure on India's option.

CTBT (1996): India blocked the treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where its envoy Arundhati Ghose argued that it was not linked to a time-bound disarmament programme and its entry-into-force clause targeted India; the treaty was taken to the General Assembly instead.

3. Pokhran-II and the Nuclear Doctrine

Operation Shakti (11 and 13 May 1998): India conducted five tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state; Pakistan tested at the end of May.

Stated reason: Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton pointed to an overt nuclear-weapon state on India's border that had committed armed aggression in 1962, and to its help for a neighbour's covert programme.

Jaswant Singh: in his 1998 article Against Nuclear Apartheid (Foreign Affairs), he argued that India could not accept a regime that allowed some states weapons while denying others.

Post-test commitments: a voluntary moratorium on further tests, willingness to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and strict export controls.

Draft doctrine (1999): prepared by the National Security Advisory Board, whose convenor was K. Subrahmanyam, often called the father of India's nuclear doctrine.

Official doctrine (January 2003): credible minimum deterrence; no first use; nuclear weapons used only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or Indian forces anywhere; retaliation to be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.

Other features: non-use against non-nuclear-weapon states; the option of a nuclear response to a major biological or chemical attack; continued commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Command and control: the Nuclear Command Authority has a Political Council chaired by the Prime Minister, the only body that can authorise use, and an Executive Council chaired by the National Security Adviser; the Strategic Forces Command manages the arsenal.

Triad: India has land-based missiles (Agni series), aircraft and a sea-based leg; INS Arihant completed its first deterrence patrol in 2018, completing the triad.

Modernisation: in March 2024 India tested an Agni-V missile with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (Mission Divyastra), which strengthens the survivability of its second-strike capability.

4. From Isolation to Integration

India-US civil nuclear deal (2005-2008): India separated civil and military facilities and placed civil ones under IAEA safeguards in return for full civil nuclear cooperation.

NSG waiver (September 2008): allowed nuclear trade with India, the only state outside the NPT to receive such an exemption; India then signed cooperation agreements with France, Russia, Canada, Australia, Japan and others.

IAEA Additional Protocol: India signed it in 2009 and it entered into force in 2014.

Export control regimes: India joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (2016), the Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and the Australia Group (2018).

NSG membership: India applied in 2016, but China and a few others blocked it at the Seoul plenary, arguing that non-NPT states need a common criteria-based approach, which would also open the door for Pakistan.

Civil nuclear liability: India's Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 allows operators to seek recourse against suppliers, which foreign suppliers say has discouraged new reactor deals; the government has discussed amending it.

5. Debates and Changing Perceptions

No first use debate: some strategists argue NFU limits options against Pakistan's tactical weapons; Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said in 2019 that India had strictly adhered to NFU but what happens in future depends on circumstances, while the official doctrine has not changed.

Pakistan's posture: Pakistan has no NFU and has developed short-range tactical nuclear weapons such as Nasr, aiming to deter Indian conventional operations below the nuclear threshold.

Waltz versus Sagan: Kenneth Waltz argued that the spread of nuclear weapons may bring stability through deterrence (more may be better), while Scott Sagan warned that organisational failures make proliferation dangerous; South Asia is their favourite test case.

Stability-instability paradox: nuclear deterrence may prevent full war but encourage lower-level conflict, as Kargil (1999) and terror attacks suggest; India's responses in 2016, 2019 and 2025 tested Pakistan's nuclear threshold.

Disarmament today: India supports a nuclear weapons convention and a no-first-use agreement among all nuclear states, but did not join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017), saying it does not add to customary law and was negotiated outside the Conference on Disarmament.

Shift in self-image: India moved from moral critic of nuclear weapons to a responsible nuclear power with an impeccable non-proliferation record, a shift realists explain by security needs and constructivists by changing identity.

Energy angle: nuclear power matters for India's clean energy goals; small modular reactors and private participation are being discussed as the next phase.

6. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: list India's objections to the NPT and CTBT, or the main features of the 2003 doctrine, with one line of evaluation.

20-mark answer on changing perceptions: phases (disarmament idealism, option open, weaponisation, integration), drivers of change (China, Pakistan, discriminatory regimes), the doctrine, the 2008 waiver, and debates on NFU.

15-mark variant on the doctrine: state its elements, explain the logic of NFU (restraint, lower costs, moral standing) and of massive retaliation (credibility), then weigh the case for review against Pakistan's tactical weapons.

Keywords: nuclear apartheid, credible minimum deterrence, no first use, massive retaliation, NSG waiver, stability-instability paradox, triad.

Usable idea: India argues that it is a responsible nuclear power with an impeccable non-proliferation record, which is why it received a unique NSG waiver; use it to show how India turned exception into acceptance.

1. India and Afghanistan

Historical ties: close relations with Afghan governments, including the Soviet-backed regime of the 1980s; the Taliban regime of 1996-2001 was hostile and backed by Pakistan.

IC-814 hijacking (1999): an Indian Airlines flight was hijacked to Kandahar, and India had to release three militants, including Masood Azhar, who later founded Jaish-e-Mohammed.

After 2001: India became one of the largest regional donors, committing about three billion US dollars, without sending troops.

Flagship projects: the Zaranj-Delaram highway (2009), the Afghan Parliament building (2015), the Afghan-India Friendship Dam (Salma Dam, 2016), power lines, schools, hospitals and scholarships for thousands of Afghan students.

Strategic Partnership Agreement (2011): the first such agreement Afghanistan signed with any country, including training of Afghan security forces.

Chabahar link: because Pakistan denies transit, India developed Iran's Chabahar port and signed a transit agreement with Iran and Afghanistan in 2016 to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Exclusion and the US exit: India was not part of the 2020 US-Taliban Doha agreement; after the Taliban took Kabul in August 2021, India evacuated its people (Operation Devi Shakti) and closed its embassy.

Calibrated re-engagement: India sent wheat, medicines and vaccines as humanitarian aid, placed a technical team in its Kabul embassy in June 2022, and its Foreign Secretary met the Taliban's acting foreign minister in Dubai in January 2025, without formally recognising the regime.

India's interests: no use of Afghan soil for terrorism against India (as demanded by UNSC Resolution 2593), an inclusive government, rights of women and minorities, and protection of Indian investments.

2. India and the Iraq Crisis

Gulf War (1990-91): India organised one of the largest civilian evacuations in history, flying out about 1.7 lakh Indians from Kuwait, mostly by Air India.

2003 invasion: India opposed military action without UN authorisation; in April 2003 both Houses of Parliament adopted a resolution deploring the military action and calling for withdrawal of coalition forces.

No troops: in July 2003 the government declined a US request to send Indian troops to Iraq, saying it would consider it only under an explicit UN mandate.

Significance: the decision showed strategic autonomy at a time of growing closeness to the US, and India's commitment to UN-based legitimacy.

ISIS period: in 2014 Indian nurses trapped in Tikrit were brought home, while 39 Indian workers abducted in Mosul were confirmed dead in 2018; Iraq remains one of India's largest crude oil suppliers.

3. West Asia and the Gulf

Stakes: the Gulf hosts about nine million Indians, is the largest source of remittances to India, and supplies a large share of India's oil and gas.

From Look West to Link West: India shifted from a buyer-seller relationship to strategic partnerships, with closer security, investment and food-energy cooperation.

UAE: a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2017) and a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (2022), India's first trade deal of its kind in years; trade settlement in local currencies has begun.

Saudi Arabia: a Strategic Partnership Council set up in 2019, energy and investment ties, and cooperation on counter-terrorism.

Iran: ties are shaped by Chabahar (a ten-year operating contract signed in May 2024), the International North-South Transport Corridor, and the effect of US sanctions, which ended India's oil imports from Iran in 2019.

New minilaterals: I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US, 2022) on food and clean energy, and IMEC (2023) linking India to Europe via the Gulf and Israel.

Protecting citizens: evacuations such as Operation Rahat (Yemen, 2015) and Operation Ajay (Israel, 2023), and Qatar's release in 2024 of eight former Indian Navy personnel, show diaspora protection as a core goal.

Maritime security: the Indian Navy deployed in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden after attacks on shipping in 2023-24, acting as a first responder for merchant vessels.

4. India, Israel and Palestine

Early caution: India voted against the 1947 UN partition plan, recognised Israel in 1950 but kept relations at consular level for decades, partly out of solidarity with the Arab world and concern for domestic opinion and Gulf ties.

Support for Palestine: India recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 and recognised the State of Palestine in 1988.

Full diplomatic relations (1992): established after the Cold War and the Madrid peace process, under Narasimha Rao.

Growing partnership: Israel became a major defence supplier (drones, missiles, radars) and helped during Kargil; cooperation extends to agriculture (Centres of Excellence), water and technology.

De-hyphenation: Prime Minister Modi's July 2017 visit was the first by an Indian PM to Israel and did not include Palestine, while his separate February 2018 visit to Ramallah was the first to Palestine, showing that each relationship stands on its own.

After 7 October 2023: India condemned the Hamas attack as terrorism, called for respect for international humanitarian law, sent aid to Gaza, and reaffirmed support for a two-state solution; it abstained on a UN General Assembly resolution in October 2023 but voted for a ceasefire resolution in December 2023.

Debate: critics say closeness to Israel weakens India's traditional moral position; supporters say de-hyphenation reflects national interest and that India still funds Palestinian development and UN relief for refugees.

5. Vision of a New World Order

Multipolarity: India seeks a multipolar world and a multipolar Asia, in which no single power, US or Chinese, dominates.

Reformed multilateralism: reform of the UN Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO so that they reflect current realities and the developing world.

G20 presidency (2023): under the theme One Earth, One Family, One Future (from Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam), India secured a consensus New Delhi Leaders' Declaration and permanent membership for the African Union.

Global public goods: the International Solar Alliance (launched with France in 2015), the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (2019), Mission LiFE (2021), the Global Biofuels Alliance (2023), Vaccine Maitri and digital public infrastructure.

Voice of the Global South: India presents itself as a bridge between North and South and between East and West, often described in official language as Vishwa Bandhu (friend of the world).

Rules-based order with Indian characteristics: India supports freedom of navigation and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but also opposes unilateral sanctions and Western double standards.

Scholarly frames: Amitav Acharya, in The End of American World Order (2014), describes a multiplex world of many actors and orders, a picture that fits India's preference for plural, issue-based coalitions.

Critique: sceptics argue that India's capacity (defence spending, diplomatic corps, development finance) lags behind its ambitions, and that its own neighbourhood troubles weaken its claim to global leadership.

6. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer on Afghanistan: development partnership, the shock of 2021, and India's calibrated engagement with clear red lines on terrorism.

20-mark answer on West Asia: energy, diaspora and security interests, the Gulf partnerships, Iran and connectivity, de-hyphenation with Israel and Palestine, and the balancing challenges after October 2023.

Answer on a new world order: define multipolarity and reformed multilateralism, give G20 and climate initiatives as evidence, and add a critique on capacity.

Keywords: calibrated engagement, de-hyphenation, Link West, strategic autonomy, multipolarity, reformed multilateralism, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.

Caution: conflicts in West Asia and Afghanistan change quickly; write about India's principles and lasting interests, and avoid presenting unconfirmed recent events as fact.

1. Core ideas: why West Asia matters

West Asia (the Gulf, Iran, Iraq, the Levant and Israel) is part of India's extended neighbourhood: it supplies most of India's crude oil and much of its LNG, hosts nearly 9 million Indians in the Gulf states, is one of the largest sources of remittances, and is a major trade and investment partner.

Look West: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005 called the Gulf part of India's natural economic hinterland and urged a Look West approach to match Look East; the Modi government's version, described in official commentary as Think West or Link West, brought frequent high-level visits to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Israel, Palestine and Iran.

A tangle, not a single contest (2026 question): the region has several overlapping rivalries (Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Israel vs Iran and its allied armed groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and intra-Gulf quarrels such as the 2017-21 blockade of Qatar), bargains (the Abraham Accords of 2020, the China-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement of March 2023, OPEC+ coordination with Russia) and anxieties (US retrenchment, nuclear proliferation, militias, succession and economic diversification).

India therefore does not join any camp; it builds issue-based partnerships with each actor, a practice described as multi-alignment and, for Israel and Palestine, de-hyphenation.

Recent shocks: the Gaza war since October 2023, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, the fall of the Assad government in Syria (December 2024) and the Israel-Iran war of June 2025 showed how quickly the region can disrupt India's energy, trade and diaspora interests.

2. The Gulf

From buyer-seller to strategic partners: the Delhi Declaration (2006) and Riyadh Declaration (2010) with Saudi Arabia, a Strategic Partnership Council (2019), and a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the UAE (2017) moved ties beyond oil and labour.

Trade and investment: the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (signed February 2022, in force May 2022) was India's first comprehensive trade agreement in about a decade; there are local-currency settlement, UPI and RuPay links, sovereign wealth fund investments, and talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council on a free trade agreement.

Energy security: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait are long-standing crude suppliers and Qatar is the main LNG supplier; the UAE's national oil company stores crude in India's strategic petroleum reserve at Mangaluru; Russian oil took a larger share after 2022, but Gulf supplies remain the backbone.

Diaspora and remittances: Indian workers in construction, services and professions help make India the world's largest recipient of remittances; their welfare (the kafala sponsorship system, unpaid wages, legal cases) is a constant task, and the release of eight former Indian Navy personnel by Qatar in February 2024 showed the value of leader-level diplomacy.

Political signals: Sushma Swaraj addressed the OIC foreign ministers' meeting in Abu Dhabi as guest of honour (2019); Modi received the highest civilian honours of Saudi Arabia (2016) and the UAE (2019); the BAPS temple in Abu Dhabi opened in 2024; defence exercises and counter-terrorism cooperation, including the deportation of wanted fugitives, have grown.

I2U2 (2023 question): India, Israel, the UAE and the US formed a grouping (foreign ministers met in October 2021; first leaders' summit, held virtually, in July 2022), often called the West Asia Quad; it focuses on food security, clean energy, water, health, space and transport, and the UAE pledged about 2 billion US dollars for integrated food parks in India.

Its significance for Look West: it joins Indian markets and labour, Israeli technology, Gulf capital and US backing, lets India work with Israel and an Arab state together, and builds on the Abraham Accords without military commitments.

IMEC: the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi (September 2023) by India, the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the EU, France, Germany and Italy; it plans shipping and rail links from India via the Gulf and Israel to Europe, with energy and data cables, and is seen as an alternative to the Belt and Road, though the Gaza war has slowed it.

3. Iran

Civilisational and strategic ties: the Tehran Declaration (2001) and New Delhi Declaration (2003, when President Khatami was Republic Day chief guest) sought a strategic partnership; Iran is India's gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan.

Chabahar: a port on the Gulf of Oman less than 200 km from Pakistan's Chinese-built Gwadar; India, Iran and Afghanistan signed a trilateral transit agreement in May 2016, India Ports Global has run the Shahid Beheshti terminal since 2018 and signed a ten-year operating contract in May 2024, and India has shipped wheat to Afghanistan through it.

INSTC: the International North-South Transport Corridor (agreement of 2000 among India, Iran and Russia) links Mumbai with Bandar Abbas and onward by rail and road to Russia, shortening transit compared with the Suez route; Chabahar complements it.

Sanctions: India voted against Iran at the IAEA Board in 2005 and 2006, at the time of the India-US nuclear deal; ties revived after the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), but after the US left it (2018) and ended oil waivers (May 2019) India stopped buying Iranian oil, losing leverage; the US exempted Chabahar for Afghanistan's reconstruction but warned of sanctions risk after the 2024 contract.

Challenges and limitations (2023 question): US sanctions and banking problems, slow progress on Chabahar and its rail links, the loss of the Farzad-B gas field contract to an Iranian firm (2021), Iranian comments on Kashmir and Indian Muslims, Iran's closeness to China (25-year cooperation agreement, 2021) and Russia, India's ties with Israel and the Gulf, and the Taliban's return in Afghanistan.

Energy security (2019 question): US-Iran tension raises oil prices and insurance costs and threatens shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which a large share of India's crude and LNG imports pass; India diversified suppliers and launched Operation Sankalp (2019) to escort Indian-flagged ships in the Gulf.

Iran joined the SCO (2023) and BRICS (2024), forums where India also sits, which gives India more channels to manage the relationship.

4. Israel

Slow start: India recognised Israel in September 1950 and allowed a consulate in Mumbai, but avoided full ties because of solidarity with the Arab world, non-alignment, oil and domestic opinion; full diplomatic relations came in January 1992 under P.V. Narasimha Rao, after the Cold War and the Madrid peace conference.

Fast growth (2014 question): Israel supplied ammunition and equipment during Kargil (1999); Ariel Sharon visited India in 2003; Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel (July 2017), when ties were raised to a strategic partnership, and Netanyahu visited India in January 2018.

Three areas of security cooperation (2026 question): first, defence trade and co-development, including the Phalcon AWACS, Heron and Searcher drones, Spice guided bombs (reported to have been used at Balakot, 2019) and the jointly developed Barak-8 (MRSAM) air defence system, now with production in India such as the Adani-Elbit drone unit in Hyderabad; second, counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing, including homeland security and border management technology; third, cyber security and emerging technologies.

Other sectors since 2014 (2020 question): agriculture (Indo-Israel Centres of Excellence for horticulture and drip irrigation), water management and desalination, innovation (the India-Israel Industrial R and D and Technological Innovation Fund, 2017), health, space, labour mobility for Israel's construction sector, and the acquisition of Haifa port by a consortium led by Adani (2023).

Autonomy (2022 question): India deepened ties with Israel despite Arab and domestic pressures while keeping its support for Palestine, buys Israeli arms while also buying from Russia and others, and kept engaging Iran despite Israel's hostility to it; these show choices driven by national interest rather than bloc alignment.

5. Palestine policy and de-hyphenation

Historic stance: Gandhi wrote in Harijan (1938) that Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English; India voted against the UN partition plan (1947), recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (1974) and recognised the State of Palestine in 1988.

Continuity: India supports a negotiated two-state solution leading to a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine living side by side in peace with Israel, gives development aid for schools, hospitals and institutions, and contributes to UNRWA.

De-hyphenation: since about 2017 India treats relations with Israel and with Palestine separately, each on its own merits; Modi visited Israel in 2017 without going to Ramallah and visited Palestine separately in February 2018, the first Indian Prime Minister to do so.

Voting pattern: India abstained on a UN Human Rights Council resolution on the 2014 Gaza conflict (2015) and voted with Israel at the UN Economic and Social Council (2019) against observer status for a Palestinian NGO, yet voted against the US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital at the UN General Assembly (December 2017).

Does closeness to Israel help Palestine (2017 and 2019 questions)? One view: trust with Israel lets India speak credibly for restraint and humanitarian access; the other: softer criticism at the UN reduces pressure on Israel; a balanced answer notes India's continuing aid and support for statehood alongside a more pragmatic tone.

6. Crises: Iraq, Yemen and the Israel-Hamas war

Iraq: in 1990-91 India airlifted about 1.7 lakh Indians from Kuwait, one of the largest civilian air evacuations ever; in 2003 Parliament passed a resolution deploring the US-led invasion and India declined to send troops; in 2014, during the ISIS advance, India secured the return of 46 Indian nurses from Tikrit, while 39 Indian workers abducted in Mosul were confirmed killed in 2018.

Implications of turmoil (2014 question): risks to oil supplies and prices, to the safety of workers and remittances, radicalisation and online recruitment by ISIS, threats to shipping, and pressure on India to take sides in sectarian conflicts.

Yemen: Operation Rahat (2015) evacuated more than 4,600 Indians and about 950 foreign nationals from Yemen by sea and air, winning international praise; India's humanitarian role in Yemen and Iraq has rested on evacuation, food and medical aid, and neutrality among the warring sides.

Red Sea: Houthi attacks on shipping from late 2023 raised freight costs for India's trade with Europe; the Indian Navy deployed warships in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden to protect merchant vessels, including ships not flagged in India.

Israel-Hamas war: after the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, Prime Minister Modi condemned it as a terrorist attack; India ran Operation Ajay to bring back citizens from Israel, sent humanitarian aid to Gaza through Egypt, and reiterated support for a two-state solution.

At the UN General Assembly India abstained on the October 2023 resolution calling for a humanitarian truce, which did not name Hamas, but voted for the December 2023 resolution demanding a humanitarian ceasefire and for the May 2024 resolution backing Palestine's case for full UN membership.

Continuity and change (2024 question): continuity in support for statehood, humanitarian aid and the two-state solution; change in the explicit condemnation of terrorism, closer ties with Israel and a calibrated voting record; the position reflects India's own experience of terrorism, its diaspora and energy interests in the Arab world, and its Global South image.

Israel-Iran war (June 2025): India urged de-escalation through dialogue and diplomacy and evacuated its citizens under Operation Sindhu, showing again the need to keep lines open to both sides.

7. India's interests and options

Interests (2019 question): energy security, diaspora safety and remittances, trade and investment, connectivity (Chabahar, INSTC, IMEC), maritime security in the Gulf and Red Sea, counter-terrorism and countering radicalisation, defence technology from Israel, and support from Gulf states on Kashmir in Islamic forums.

Options: continue multi-alignment with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran and Israel; build minilaterals (I2U2, IMEC); diversify energy and partner the Gulf on renewables and green hydrogen; protect sea lanes with naval presence; and use credibility with all sides for humanitarian diplomacy rather than mediation in core conflicts.

8. Using it in the exam

10-mark answer: state the basis of ties, give two or three concrete instruments (treaty, project, operation) and one challenge, and close with India's balancing approach.

15/20-mark answer: use a short timeline (1950, 1992 and 2017 for Israel; 2016 and 2024 for Chabahar), show both sides of the balance, cite specific UN votes or operations, and connect the answer to strategic autonomy and the Global South.

Keywords: Look West, extended neighbourhood, de-hyphenation, strategic autonomy, multi-alignment, energy security, diaspora diplomacy, minilateralism, connectivity corridors.

Quotation: Gandhi's 1938 view in Harijan that Palestine belongs to the Arabs as England belongs to the English shows the roots of India's Palestine policy; use it as an attributed paraphrase.

1. Core ideas: why groupings matter

Plurilateral and minilateral diplomacy: with the UN Security Council often deadlocked and the WTO's negotiating function weakened, states increasingly work through smaller groups built around a task, such as economic coordination (G20), development finance (BRICS), regional security (SCO) or maritime and technology cooperation (Quad).

Issue-based multi-alignment: India joins different partners on different issues, often in groupings whose members are rivals; S. Jaishankar, in The India Way (2020), argues for engaging America, managing China, cultivating Europe, reassuring Russia and bringing Japan into play at the same time (paraphrase).

Continuity with non-alignment: like non-alignment, multi-alignment protects strategic autonomy; unlike it, India now seeks active partnerships with all poles rather than distance from blocs.

Interests served: a voice in reforming global institutions (reformed multilateralism), leadership of the Global South, balancing China, access to technology, capital and energy, counter-terrorism cooperation and connectivity.

2. BRICS

Origin: the Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill coined the term BRIC in 2001 for large, fast-growing emerging economies; the foreign ministers first met in 2006, the first leaders' summit was held at Yekaterinburg (Russia) in June 2009, and South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS.

Expansion: at the Johannesburg summit (August 2023) six states were invited; Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE joined from January 2024, Argentina declined, and Saudi Arabia has not formally confirmed membership; Indonesia joined in January 2025, and a category of partner countries was created at the Kazan summit (October 2024).

New Development Bank: agreed at the Fortaleza summit (2014) and headquartered in Shanghai, with the Indian banker K.V. Kamath as its first president and equal shareholding among the five founders; it funds infrastructure and sustainable development and has admitted new members such as Bangladesh, the UAE and Egypt.

Contingent Reserve Arrangement (2014): a pool of 100 billion US dollars that members can draw on for short-term balance-of-payments support, a modest alternative to sole reliance on the IMF.

India's gains: a platform for reform of the IMF, World Bank and UN Security Council, South-South cooperation, development finance, counter-terrorism language in declarations, and a place to meet China and Russia, as at the Kazan summit (October 2024) where Modi and Xi Jinping held their first formal bilateral meeting in five years, just after the India–China agreement on border patrolling.

India's concerns: Chinese dominance, the risk that an enlarged BRICS turns into an anti-Western bloc, and proposals for a common currency; India has said it does not seek de-dollarisation and prefers trade settlement in local currencies, and it insisted that expansion follow agreed criteria and consensus.

Limits: very different political systems, the India–China rivalry, no permanent secretariat and slow growth of intra-BRICS trade; still, the members together hold a large share of the world's population and output, which gives their joint positions weight; India is due to chair BRICS in 2026, after Brazil in 2025.

3. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

Origin: the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 1996) began with border confidence-building; with Uzbekistan it became the SCO in June 2001, and its charter was signed in 2002.

Membership: India and Pakistan, observers from 2005, became full members at the Astana summit in June 2017; Iran joined in 2023 under India's chairship and Belarus in 2024, making ten members.

RATS: the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, based in Tashkent, coordinates action against what the SCO calls the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism, through information sharing, databases and joint exercises such as the Peace Mission series.

Value for India: a link to Central Asia and its energy (the Connect Central Asia policy of 2012), a counter-terrorism platform, a forum on Afghanistan, regular contact with Russia and China, and a way to keep the region from becoming an exclusive Chinese sphere.

India's chairship (2023): India hosted a virtual summit in July 2023 under the theme SECURE: Security, Economic development, Connectivity, Unity, Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Environmental protection.

Friction: India has not endorsed China's Belt and Road Initiative in SCO declarations since 2018, because the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir; Pakistan uses the forum to raise Kashmir; and in June 2025 India declined to sign the SCO defence ministers' joint statement at Qingdao because it left out the Pahalgam terror attack.

Evaluation: the SCO keeps India's continental foothold in Eurasia, but China's weight, Pakistan's presence and Russia's growing dependence on China limit what India can achieve there.

4. G20 and India's 2023 presidency

Origin: created in 1999 as a forum of finance ministers and central bank governors after the Asian financial crisis, and raised to leaders' level in 2008 during the global financial crisis; it has 19 countries, the EU and, since 2023, the African Union, and accounts for most of world output and trade.

India's presidency (December 2022 to November 2023): the theme was Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, One Earth, One Family, One Future; meetings were held in cities across the country to make it a people's G20, and India convened the Voice of the Global South Summit (January 2023) to carry developing countries' priorities to the table.

New Delhi Leaders' Declaration (September 2023): adopted by consensus despite divisions over Ukraine; it called on states to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty under the UN Charter and repeated that today's era must not be of war, without naming Russia.

Agenda carried: reform of multilateral development banks, debt vulnerabilities, the Green Development Pact, Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE), Digital Public Infrastructure, women-led development and food security.

African Union: admitted as a permanent member at the New Delhi summit, the first enlargement since the G20 began, a step India had championed as the voice of the Global South.

Other outcomes: the Global Biofuels Alliance was launched and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was announced on the sidelines; India's year was part of a run of Global South presidencies (Indonesia 2022, India 2023, Brazil 2024, South Africa 2025).

Significance: the presidency showed India as a bridge between the G7 and the Global South, raised its diplomatic standing and placed development, climate finance and digital public goods on the agenda; critics note that G20 declarations are non-binding and that the forum cannot settle security disputes.

5. The Quad

Origin: the navies of India, the US, Japan and Australia worked together as a core group after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami; the first Quadrilateral Security Dialogue meeting was held in 2007 on the initiative of Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, but the grouping lapsed after Australia withdrew in 2008 amid Chinese objections.

Revival: officials met again in Manila in November 2017 and foreign ministers from 2019; the first leaders' summit (virtual) was held in March 2021, followed by in-person summits in Washington (2021), Tokyo (2022), Hiroshima (2023) and Wilmington (2024); Australia rejoined the Malabar naval exercise in 2020.

Agenda: a largely non-military agenda of public goods: vaccines (the Quad Vaccine Partnership), critical and emerging technologies, climate, health security, infrastructure, cyber security, space, the Quad Fellowship, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (2022) and the Quad Cancer Moonshot (2024).

Growing significance (2021 question): the Quad gives India partners in balancing China at sea without an alliance, access to technology and resilient supply chains, support for its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean, and recognition of its central place in the Indo-Pacific.

Strategic balancing against China (2023 question): the Quad supports India's balancing through maritime domain awareness, interoperability (Malabar), diversification of supply chains and diplomatic signalling after the 2020 Galwan clash; but India avoids alliance language and keeps talking to China, so the Quad is one element of balancing alongside self-strengthening, bilateral partnerships and multi-alignment.

Limits: no treaty, secretariat or common defence commitment; differences over Russia; swings in US policy; Chinese criticism that it is containment or an Asian NATO; and India is the only member that is not a US treaty ally.

Beyond summit-driven diplomacy (2026 question): because the Quad depends on leaders' summits and political will (the 2023 Sydney summit was called off and the leaders met in Hiroshima instead), analysts propose a light secretariat or standing coordination mechanism, funded working groups, long-running projects with ASEAN and Pacific island states, and links with other minilaterals; a strong answer weighs this against India's preference for flexibility and its reluctance to institutionalise a security bloc.

6. The Indo-Pacific

From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific (2024 question): the older Asia-Pacific framing centred on the Pacific Rim and APEC and left India out; the Indo-Pacific joins the Indian and Pacific Oceans into one strategic space, reflecting sea lanes from the Gulf to East Asia, China's expanding naval and economic reach and the rise of India.

Milestones of the shift: Abe's 'Confluence of the Two Seas' speech to India's Parliament (2007), Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (2016), and the renaming of the US Pacific Command as Indo-Pacific Command (2018).

India's vision: at the Shangri-La Dialogue (June 2018) Modi described the Indo-Pacific as a natural region, free, open and inclusive, not a strategy or a club of limited members, with ASEAN centrality, a rules-based order, freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes; the Ministry of External Affairs set up an Indo-Pacific division in 2019.

SAGAR and MAHASAGAR: SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) was announced in Mauritius in 2015 for the Indian Ocean; in March 2025, again in Mauritius, it was widened into MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), extending the idea to the Global South.

IPOI: the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (East Asia Summit, Bangkok, November 2019) is an open, non-treaty framework with seven pillars: maritime security; maritime ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology and academic cooperation; and trade, connectivity and maritime transport; partner countries lead individual pillars.

Response to the Indo-Pacific idea (2019 question): India embraced the term but defined it inclusively, stressing ASEAN centrality and a geography from the shores of Africa to the Americas, and refused to make it an anti-China alliance; it backed this with Act East, SAGAR, the Quad, naval deployments and capacity building for island states.

Free and open Indo-Pacific and connectivity (2025 question): India works with the US, Japan, Australia, France, the EU, ASEAN states and island nations through the Quad, trilaterals such as India–France–Australia, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (joined in 2022, but not its trade pillar), IMEC, Act East projects and port development, so that sea lanes stay open and connectivity is not monopolised by the Belt and Road.

AUKUS (context): the security pact of Australia, the UK and the US (September 2021) will help Australia acquire nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines; India said it was neither relevant to nor in competition with the Quad, but it shows the hard-security turn in Indo-Pacific balancing, and it angered France, whose submarine contract Australia cancelled.

South China Sea (2019 question): India is not a claimant but has interests in freedom of navigation and overflight, its trade with East Asia and the Pacific, and ONGC Videsh's exploration with Vietnam; it calls for peaceful settlement under international law, especially UNCLOS 1982, and for a Code of Conduct that does not prejudice the legitimate interests of third parties.

Shift in tone: India was cautious after the 2016 arbitral award in the Philippines' case against China, but in a 2023 joint statement with the Philippines called for adherence to it, and it has sold BrahMos missiles to the Philippines (contract 2022), showing a firmer stance tied to Act East.

7. Other groupings: BIMSTEC, IORA, I2U2 and IMEC

BIMSTEC: founded in 1997 (Bangkok Declaration), it has seven Bay of Bengal members (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand); its charter was adopted in 2022, and India promotes it as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia, partly because SAARC is stalled.

IORA: the Indian Ocean Rim Association, founded in 1997 with its secretariat in Mauritius, promotes maritime safety, the blue economy, trade and disaster management among littoral states, in line with SAGAR.

I2U2 and IMEC: the I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE and the US, 2021–22) and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (2023) carry the minilateral approach westwards (see the West Asia topic).

8. The Russia–Ukraine war and these groupings

India's position: India abstained on most UN resolutions condemning Russia, called for dialogue, diplomacy and respect for the UN Charter, sovereignty and territorial integrity, raised its purchases of discounted Russian oil, and told Putin at the SCO summit in Samarkand (September 2022) that today's era is not one of war.

Effect on the G20: the war split the G20 over wording; the Bali Declaration (2022) adopted the line that today's era must not be of war, and the New Delhi consensus kept the grouping working when a deadlock was feared.

Effect on the Quad: the US, Japan and Australia condemned Russia while India did not, so Quad statements refer to principles (sovereignty, territorial integrity, the UN Charter) without naming Russia, which shows that the Quad's focus is the Indo-Pacific, not Europe.

Effect on BRICS and the SCO: Western sanctions pushed Russia closer to China and made BRICS and the SCO more important to Moscow; India uses these forums to keep Russia engaged and limit its dependence on China, while resisting any anti-Western turn.

Strategic autonomy in practice: Modi visited Moscow (July 2024) and Kyiv (August 2024); India attended the Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland (June 2024) but did not endorse its communique, arguing that both parties must be at the table.

The debate (2025 and 2014 questions): supporters call this principled strategic autonomy rooted in national interest (energy, defence supplies, Russia as a counterweight to China); critics call it fence-sitting that weakens India's defence of sovereignty; realists read the conflict as power politics over NATO expansion and spheres of influence, while liberals stress the violation of sovereignty and international law.

9. Using it in the exam

10-mark answer: define the grouping in one line with founding year and members, give two or three concrete initiatives or outcomes, one limitation and one line on India's interest.

15/20-mark answer: open with multi-alignment or strategic autonomy, analyse the grouping's role for India with specific evidence (dates, initiatives, declarations), set out challenges (China, Russia, US unpredictability, weak institutions), compare it with other groupings India belongs to, and conclude with a balanced view.

Keywords: issue-based multi-alignment, strategic autonomy, minilateralism, ASEAN centrality, free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific, net security provider, Global South, reformed multilateralism.

Quotation: Modi told Putin at Samarkand (2022) that today's era is not an era of war; use it as an attributed paraphrase.

Quotation: at the Shangri-La Dialogue (2018) Modi said India does not see the Indo-Pacific as a strategy or a club of limited members (attributed paraphrase).