Indian Foreign Policy, Non-Alignment and South Asia — UPSC PSIR Optional Notes

1. Meaning and Core Ideas

Foreign policy: the set of goals, principles and instruments a state uses to deal with other states and international bodies in pursuit of its national interest.

National interest: in India's case usually read as security of territory, economic development, a peaceful periphery and a larger voice in global institutions.

Strategic autonomy: the freedom to take decisions on the basis of one's own interests, without being bound to any bloc or alliance; it is the thread running from Nehru to the present.

Determinants: the relatively fixed factors (geography, history, culture) and the changing factors (economy, leadership, domestic politics, global power structure) that shape what a state can and wants to do.

2. Determinants of India's Foreign Policy

Geography: India sits at the centre of South Asia and the Indian Ocean, shares land borders with seven countries and has a long coastline; this makes both the Himalayan frontier and sea lanes central to its security.

History and the colonial experience: two centuries of British rule produced a deep commitment to anti-colonialism, anti-racism and suspicion of great-power blocs.

Freedom struggle: the Indian National Congress set up a Foreign Department in 1925 and passed resolutions on world affairs, so many post-1947 positions were already formed before independence.

Culture and values: ideas of tolerance, non-violence and Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family) are used to frame India's diplomacy, from Panchsheel to the G20 theme of 2023.

Economy: a closed, aid-dependent economy before 1991 limited India's choices; after the 1991 reforms, trade, investment, energy and technology became major drivers of diplomacy.

Domestic politics and federalism: states influence policy towards neighbours, for example Tamil Nadu on Sri Lanka and West Bengal on the Teesta water deal with Bangladesh; coalition governments of the 1990s made bold moves harder.

Leadership: individual leaders left clear marks: Nehru (non-alignment), Indira Gandhi (1971 and hard realism), Narasimha Rao (economic opening and Look East), Vajpayee (1998 tests and outreach to the US), Manmohan Singh (nuclear deal) and Narendra Modi (Neighbourhood First, Act East, multi-alignment).

International system: bipolar Cold War, the brief US-led unipolar moment after 1991 and today's multipolar order with a rising China each pushed India to adjust its partnerships.

Security environment: two nuclear-armed neighbours with whom India has unsettled borders (Pakistan and China) make the China-Pakistan axis a permanent factor in decision-making.

Diaspora: more than three crore people of Indian origin and Indian citizens abroad send large remittances and act as a lobby, as seen in support for the India-US nuclear deal.

3. Institutions of Policy-Making

Constitutional basis: foreign affairs, diplomatic representation, the UN, treaties, war and peace and citizenship are in the Union List (Seventh Schedule, List I); the Union's executive power extends to these matters under Article 73.

Article 253: Parliament can make laws for any part of India to implement treaties and international decisions, even on State List subjects.

Article 51 (Directive Principles): the State shall endeavour to promote international peace and security, just and honourable relations between nations, respect for international law and settlement of disputes by arbitration.

Prime Minister and PMO: since Nehru, who was also his own foreign minister, the Prime Minister has been the centre of foreign policy; the PMO has grown stronger over time.

Ministry of External Affairs and the Indian Foreign Service: they run day-to-day diplomacy through missions abroad; a frequent criticism is that the service is small compared with that of China or the US.

National Security Council (1998): set up under the Vajpayee government with a National Security Adviser (first NSA: Brajesh Mishra), a Strategic Policy Group and a National Security Advisory Board.

Cabinet Committee on Security: the PM-led body that takes final decisions on defence, nuclear and major security matters.

Other actors: Ministries of Defence, Commerce and Finance, intelligence agencies, the armed forces, think tanks, business bodies and the media.

Parliament: treaties do not need parliamentary ratification in India; Parliament influences policy through debates, questions and the Standing Committee on External Affairs, but rarely shapes decisions directly.

Courts on treaties and territory: in In re Berubari Union (1960) the Supreme Court held that ceding Indian territory needs a constitutional amendment, while in Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v Union of India (1969) it held that settling a boundary dispute (the Kutch award) did not; the 100th Amendment (2015) gave effect to the Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh.

4. Thinkers and Interpretations

Kautilya: the Arthashastra describes the mandala (circle of states), where a neighbour is a natural enemy and the neighbour's neighbour a natural friend; realists use it to argue that India has an old tradition of statecraft.

Jawaharlal Nehru: in a broadcast of September 1946 he said India would keep away from the power politics of rival groups; he saw non-alignment as a way to protect newly won freedom and to concentrate on development.

George Tanham (RAND, 1992): argued that India lacked a written, coherent strategic culture; Indian scholars contested this, pointing to consistent patterns of behaviour.

Kanti Bajpai: identified three schools of Indian strategic thought: Nehruvians (cooperation and institutions), neoliberals (economic strength and trade) and hyperrealists (military power and deterrence).

Raja Mohan: C. Raja Mohan, in Crossing the Rubicon (2003) he argued that after 1991 India moved from idealism and third-world solidarity to pragmatic, interest-based great-power diplomacy.

NonAlignment 2.0 (2012): a report by Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Shyam Saran, Shivshankar Menon and others restated strategic autonomy for a world of interdependence.

Jaishankar: S. Jaishankar, in The India Way (2020) he argues for engaging all major powers at once, managing China, deepening ties with the US and keeping Russia reassured, an approach often called multi-alignment.

5. Continuity and Change

Continuities: strategic autonomy, refusal to join formal military alliances, support for decolonisation and the Global South, preference for multilateralism and UN reform, and priority to the neighbourhood.

Change after 1962 and 1971: defeat by China brought defence build-up; the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Bangladesh war showed a turn to realism under Indira Gandhi.

Change after 1991: the collapse of the USSR and the balance-of-payments crisis led to economic diplomacy, the Look East policy, full ties with Israel (1992) and engagement with the US.

Gujral Doctrine (1996-97): India would give to smaller neighbours without asking for reciprocity, would not let its territory be used against them, and disputes would be settled bilaterally and peacefully.

1998 to 2008: the Pokhran-II tests, the 2005 India-US framework, the civil nuclear deal and the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver brought India into the global nuclear mainstream.

Since 2014: Neighbourhood First, Act East, SAGAR (2015), the revived Quad, a sharper response to cross-border terrorism, and leadership claims for the Global South mark a more assertive style while keeping strategic autonomy.

Debate: some scholars see a decisive break with Nehru; others, including Shivshankar Menon in Choices (2016), stress that tactics changed while the goal of autonomy and development stayed the same.

6. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: define foreign policy and strategic autonomy in one line, list four or five determinants with one Indian example each, and close with how the balance between them has shifted.

20-mark answer: introduction with Nehru's vision, body divided into continuity and change by phases (1947-62, 1962-91, 1991-2014, after 2014), a paragraph on institutions, a critique (Tanham versus Indian scholars) and a conclusion on multi-alignment.

Keywords: strategic autonomy, multi-alignment, national interest, Gujral Doctrine, Neighbourhood First, strategic culture.

Usable line: Nehru told the Constituent Assembly in December 1947, in substance, that whatever policy is laid down, the art of foreign affairs lies in finding what is most advantageous to the country (paraphrased).

1. Meaning of Non-Alignment

Non-alignment: a policy of not joining military alliances of either the US-led or the Soviet-led bloc, while staying actively engaged in world affairs.

Not neutrality: a neutral state (like Switzerland) stays out of conflicts; a non-aligned state takes positions on issues, judging each on its merits, and Nehru repeatedly said non-alignment was a positive, active policy.

Not isolation: India accepted aid from both blocs and took part in the UN, the Commonwealth and peacekeeping.

Reasons for India's choice: protecting newly won sovereignty, the need for aid and technology from both sides for development, avoiding a third world war, and a civilisational belief in peaceful coexistence.

2. Origins and Founders

Asian Relations Conference (New Delhi, 1947): hosted by Nehru before independence, it expressed the idea of Asian solidarity.

Panchsheel (1954): the five principles of peaceful coexistence in the India-China agreement on trade with the Tibet region: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

Bandung Conference (1955): the Asian-African Conference in Indonesia, where 29 newly independent countries discussed colonialism and cooperation; it adopted ten principles drawing on Panchsheel.

Brioni meeting (1956): Nehru, Nasser of Egypt and Tito of Yugoslavia met in Yugoslavia, a step towards the formal movement.

Belgrade Summit (1961): the first NAM summit with 25 member states; the five founders are usually named as Nehru, Tito, Nasser, Sukarno of Indonesia and Nkrumah of Ghana.

Membership criteria (Cairo preparatory meeting, 1961): an independent policy based on coexistence, support for liberation movements, and no membership of a great-power military alliance or bilateral military pact, nor foreign bases given in that context.

3. Phases of NAM and India's Role

Phase 1, political (1961 to late 1960s): focus on decolonisation, apartheid, disarmament and keeping the Cold War out of the new states; India pushed for a ban on nuclear testing and supported liberation in Africa.

Lusaka Summit (1970): the third summit turned NAM from occasional conferences into a movement with regular summits and a rotating chair.

Disarmament diplomacy: Nehru called for a standstill on nuclear testing in 1954, and in 1984 India joined Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania in the Six-Nation Five-Continent Initiative for nuclear disarmament.

Phase 2, economic (1970s): after the Algiers summit (1973), NAM, together with the G77, demanded a New International Economic Order, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974; India was a leading voice on fair terms of trade and technology transfer.

Phase 3, internal strain (1979-1989): at the Havana summit (1979) Cuba argued that the Soviet Union was NAM's natural ally, which India and Yugoslavia resisted; the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan divided members.

New Delhi Summit (1983): the seventh summit, chaired by Indira Gandhi, stressed disarmament and the economic crisis of developing countries; it was the high point of India's leadership.

Africa Fund (1986): created at the Harare summit, with Rajiv Gandhi playing a leading role, to help frontline states against apartheid South Africa.

Phase 4, post-Cold War (1990s onwards): with the blocs gone, NAM shifted to development, South-South cooperation, terrorism, UN reform and globalisation, but lost visibility.

India's lower profile: Prime Minister Modi did not attend the 2016 summit in Venezuela or the 2019 summit in Baku, sending the Vice-President instead; he did take part in the online NAM Contact Group summit on COVID-19 in May 2020.

4. Criticisms and Debates

Inconsistency: critics, especially in the West during the Cold War, called non-alignment hypocritical; US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described neutralism as immoral in a 1956 speech.

Tilt to the USSR: the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation and India's muted response to the Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956) and Afghanistan (1979) were cited as departures.

1962 test: during the war with China, Nehru asked the US and Britain for military help, which realists cite to show the limits of non-alignment without military strength.

Defence of non-alignment: supporters argue it was a rational realist strategy for a weak state, allowing India to gain aid from both blocs and keep freedom of action; a treaty with Moscow in 1971 was a tactical response to the US-China-Pakistan alignment.

Relevance debate: one view holds NAM is obsolete since there are no blocs; the other says new forms of bloc politics (US-China rivalry, sanctions, Russia-West conflict) make the idea of autonomy more relevant than ever.

Dependency critique: scholars of the dependency school argued that political non-alignment did not end economic dependence on the industrial North, which is why NAM turned to the NIEO.

Institutional weakness: NAM has no permanent secretariat or charter, its 120 members have very different interests, and its documents are long and rarely implemented.

5. Current Role: From Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment

Strategic autonomy: the core of non-alignment survives as India's insistence on taking its own decisions, for example buying the S-400 from Russia despite US sanctions law and importing Russian oil after 2022.

Multi-alignment: India now works with many partners at once, often in groups that have opposing members: the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia, and BRICS and the SCO with Russia and China.

Issue-based coalitions: rather than one permanent camp, India forms coalitions by issue, such as G4 for UN reform, BASIC on climate, and the International Solar Alliance.

Voice of the Global South: India hosted the Voice of Global South Summit online in January 2023 and, as G20 president, secured permanent G20 membership for the African Union in September 2023, carrying forward NAM's developmental agenda.

Ukraine war (2022 onwards): India abstained on most UN resolutions condemning Russia, called for dialogue and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and kept trade with Russia, a stance its critics called fence-sitting and its supporters called autonomy.

Critique of multi-alignment: some analysts warn that being everyone's partner may make India no one's ally in a crisis, and that transactional ties can look unreliable to both the West and Russia.

Answer to the critique: India's defenders reply that in a fluid multipolar world, hedging gives a large developing country the best bargaining position and avoids being drawn into others' wars.

NAM as a platform: India still values NAM as the largest grouping of developing states (120 members) for issues like terrorism, UN reform and South-South cooperation, but invests more in smaller, results-oriented groups.

6. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: define non-alignment and distinguish it from neutrality, give India's founding role (Bandung, Belgrade), and end with its present form as strategic autonomy.

20-mark answer: introduction with Nehru's 1946 broadcast idea, body by phases (political, economic, strain, post-Cold War) with India's role in each, a balanced section on criticisms and defences, and a conclusion on relevance in a polarised world.

15-mark variant: if asked about the current role only, spend one paragraph on history and give most space to strategic autonomy, the Global South agenda, the G20 presidency and the Ukraine stance.

Thinker link: Cold War Western critics saw non-alignment as opportunism, while Indian scholars like A. Appadorai and M. S. Rajan wrote that it was a considered policy rooted in national interest.

Keywords: strategic autonomy, neutrality versus non-alignment, Panchsheel, NIEO, South-South cooperation, multi-alignment, Global South.

Usable idea: Nehru argued that where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, India cannot and shall not be neutral (paraphrase of his 1949 address in the United States); this shows non-alignment was never neutrality.

1. Regionalism: Core Ideas

Regionalism: cooperation among geographically close states through institutions, ranging from a preferential trade area to a free trade area, customs union, common market and economic union (the stages described by economist Bela Balassa).

Functionalism: David Mitrany argued that cooperation in technical, non-political areas builds habits of trust that reduce conflict.

Neofunctionalism: Ernst Haas, studying Europe, argued that integration in one sector spills over into others and eventually into political integration.

Why South Asia is different: SAARC deliberately chose a functionalist path that avoided politics, yet the expected spillover did not happen because security rivalry, above all between India and Pakistan, blocked economic integration.

India-centricity: India accounts for most of the region's area, population and economy and borders every other member except Afghanistan, which creates fear of Indian dominance among smaller neighbours.

2. Origin and Structure of SAARC

Idea: President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh proposed a regional forum around 1980; India and Pakistan were initially cautious, India fearing a gang-up of neighbours and Pakistan fearing Indian dominance.

Founding: the SAARC Charter was signed at Dhaka on 8 December 1985 by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; Afghanistan became the eighth member at the New Delhi summit of 2007.

Two key Charter rules: decisions are taken by unanimity, and bilateral and contentious issues are excluded from deliberations; these rules made SAARC acceptable but also gave each member a veto.

Bodies: a summit of heads of government, a Council of Ministers, a Standing Committee of foreign secretaries, and a Secretariat at Kathmandu set up in 1987.

Observers: nine observers including China, Japan, the US, the EU, Iran, South Korea, Australia, Mauritius and Myanmar; Chinese demands for a larger role have been resisted by India.

3. Past Performance: Achievements

SAPTA: the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement was signed in 1993 and came into force in 1995, giving limited tariff concessions on selected goods.

Social and technical cooperation: conventions on suppression of terrorism (1987, with an additional protocol in 2004), on trafficking of women and children (2002), and the SAARC Food Bank (2007).

Institutions: the South Asian University in New Delhi (started 2010) and the SAARC Development Fund, both largely funded by India.

A meeting place: summits allowed India-Pakistan leaders to talk on the sidelines, for example the Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting at the Islamabad summit of January 2004.

India's goodwill gestures: the South Asia Satellite launched in 2017 for neighbours (Pakistan opted out) and a COVID-19 Emergency Fund proposed by India at a SAARC leaders' video conference in March 2020.

4. Past Performance: Failures

Summit paralysis: the 18th summit at Kathmandu (2014) was the last; the 19th, due at Islamabad in 2016, was called off after India and then Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan withdrew following the Uri terror attack.

Blocked agreements: at Kathmandu in 2014 Pakistan did not agree to the proposed motor vehicles and railways agreements, and only an energy cooperation framework was signed.

Low trade: a World Bank study, A Glass Half Full (2018), found that intra-regional trade was only about 5 percent of South Asia's total trade, among the lowest of any region, and well below its potential.

Terrorism: the 1987 convention never produced real cooperation, as cross-border terrorism from Pakistan (Mumbai 2008, Pathankot and Uri 2016, Pulwama 2019) became India's central grievance.

Asymmetry and mistrust: smaller members often see India as a big brother, while India sees some neighbours using China or Pakistan as a counterweight, so trust needed for integration is missing.

Weak secretariat and funding: the Secretariat has little power, and many decisions and declarations remain on paper.

5. South Asia as a Free Trade Area: SAFTA

SAFTA: the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area was signed at the Islamabad summit in 2004 and came into force on 1 January 2006, aiming to cut tariffs to 0 to 5 percent in phases.

Special treatment: least developed members (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Afghanistan) got longer timelines; India unilaterally removed most tariffs for the least developed members.

Sensitive lists: each member keeps long lists of products excluded from tariff cuts, which covers a large share of actual trade.

Non-tariff barriers: testing standards, poor border infrastructure, high transport costs and lack of transit rights hurt trade more than tariffs.

Pakistan and India: Pakistan did not grant India Most Favoured Nation status, and India withdrew MFN status for Pakistan after the Pulwama attack in 2019, so the largest bilateral link in SAFTA is nearly frozen.

Rules of origin: strict rules on how much value must be added within the region decide whether goods qualify for SAFTA concessions, and they are often cited as a hidden barrier.

SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services: signed in 2010, it has seen little practical progress.

Bilateral substitutes: India's free trade agreement with Sri Lanka (in force 2000), the treaties of trade with Nepal and Bhutan, and growing trade with Bangladesh have achieved more than SAFTA.

6. Future Prospects and Alternatives

Neighbourhood First (2014): all SAARC leaders were invited to the swearing-in of the new Indian government in May 2014, showing that India still saw SAARC as a frame for its neighbourhood policy at that time.

BBIN: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal signed a Motor Vehicles Agreement in 2015 as a sub-regional route around the SAARC deadlock; Bhutan's parliament has not ratified it.

BIMSTEC: founded in 1997 by the Bangkok Declaration, it links five South Asian states (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka) with Myanmar and Thailand and excludes Pakistan; its Charter was adopted at the Colombo summit in 2022.

Bridge to Act East: India invited BIMSTEC leaders to the 2019 swearing-in of the new government, signalling that it sees BIMSTEC as linking Neighbourhood First and Act East.

Arguments for reviving SAARC: it is the only body that includes all South Asian states, people-to-people links matter, and shared problems like climate change, disasters and pandemics need a regional answer.

China factor: China's trade and the Belt and Road Initiative are growing in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives; a weak SAARC leaves space for China, while India's alternative is connectivity and development finance.

What would help: trade facilitation, integrated check posts, energy grids (India already trades power with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh), and a firm separation of economic cooperation from the India-Pakistan dispute.

7. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: two lines on founding and Charter, three achievements, three failures with the 2014-2016 deadlock, and one line on BIMSTEC as an alternative.

20-mark answer: start with regionalism theory (Mitrany, Haas), then performance, SAFTA's limits with the World Bank finding, causes of failure, and a conclusion comparing SAARC with ASEAN and recommending sub-regionalism plus a revived SAARC for soft issues.

Keywords: functionalism, spillover, unanimity rule, sensitive list, non-tariff barriers, sub-regionalism, BBIN, BIMSTEC.

Usable line: analysts often say that South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world, and that SAARC has been held hostage to India-Pakistan relations; attribute data only to the World Bank study.

1. Meaning and Context

Look East Policy: India's effort, begun in 1991-92, to build economic, political and later strategic ties with Southeast and East Asia.

Why 1991: the Soviet collapse removed India's main partner, the balance-of-payments crisis pushed economic reform, and the fast-growing Asian tiger economies offered markets and investment.

Historical roots: old cultural links through Buddhism, Hinduism, trade and the Ramayana traditions of Southeast Asia, and Nehru's Asian solidarity, gave a base, though Cold War divisions had kept India and ASEAN apart.

Strategic logic: engaging the East also balanced China's rising influence and gave India a place in the emerging Asian order.

ASEAN centrality: India accepts ASEAN's role at the centre of regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.

2. Phase One (1991 to early 2000s): Economic Focus

Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN (1992): the first formal step, covering trade, investment, tourism and science.

Full Dialogue Partner (1995) and ARF (1996): India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum, the main Asian security dialogue.

Summit-level partner (2002): the first India-ASEAN summit was held in Phnom Penh in 2002.

Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (2000): India with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam for tourism, culture, education and transport.

Myanmar outreach: India moved from criticising the military regime to engaging it from the 1990s, because Myanmar is India's land bridge to ASEAN and because Northeast insurgents used its territory.

Result of phase one: trade and investment ties grew from a very low base, and India changed from a Cold War outsider to an accepted Asian partner.

3. Phase Two (2003 to 2014): Wider Region and Security

New definition: External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha described the second phase in 2003 as covering an extended East Asia from Australia to China and including security cooperation and maritime links.

East Asia Summit (2005): India became a founding member, against Chinese reluctance, with support from Japan, Singapore and Indonesia.

ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement: signed in 2009 and in force from 2010; a services and investment agreement followed in 2014-15.

Bilateral deals: a comprehensive economic agreement with Singapore (2005), CEPAs with South Korea (2009) and Japan (2011), and an agreement with Malaysia (2011).

Strategic partnership (2012): at the commemorative summit in New Delhi marking 20 years of ties, India-ASEAN relations were raised to a strategic partnership.

Defence ties: joint naval exercises and port calls with Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia, and India's growing interest in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

4. Act East Policy (2014 onwards)

Announcement: Prime Minister Modi announced the Act East Policy at the ASEAN-India and East Asia summits in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, in November 2014, signalling a shift from looking to acting.

The Cs: the policy is usually summarised as Culture, Commerce, Connectivity and Capacity building.

Wider geography: Act East explicitly includes Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Pacific Islands, through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation launched in 2014.

ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit (2018): all ten ASEAN leaders were chief guests at India's Republic Day parade in January 2018, a unique gesture.

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2022): India-ASEAN ties were upgraded once more in November 2022, on the thirtieth anniversary of relations.

Indo-Pacific link: SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region, 2015), Modi's Shangri-La Dialogue speech (2018) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (2019) placed Act East inside an Indo-Pacific vision that also accepts ASEAN centrality.

Defence exports and security: India agreed to supply BrahMos missiles to the Philippines (2022) and has strengthened maritime ties with Vietnam and Indonesia.

Quad: the revived Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (India, US, Japan, Australia) from 2017 and its leaders' summits from 2021 complement Act East, focusing on vaccines, critical technology, maritime awareness and infrastructure.

RCEP exit (2019): India walked out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in November 2019, citing an unfair deal, fears of Chinese imports, and unresolved concerns on rules of origin and safeguards.

5. The Northeast and Connectivity

Northeast as gateway: Act East treats the landlocked Northeast as India's link to Southeast Asia, aiming to end its isolation and insurgency through development.

India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway: planned to link Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand through Myanmar; it has faced long delays.

Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project: links Kolkata by sea to Sittwe port in Myanmar, then by river and road to Mizoram; Sittwe port was completed, but the road section has been slowed by conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine and Chin areas.

Bangladesh link: access to Chittagong and Mongla ports for Northeast cargo and rail links with Bangladesh are part of the same strategy.

Act East Forum with Japan (2017): a mechanism for Japanese investment in Northeast roads, power and skills.

6. Debates and Critique

Trade deficit: India's trade deficit with ASEAN widened after the goods agreement, and India has sought a review of the agreement, which talks began in 2023.

Delivery deficit: critics argue India announces more than it builds; the highway and Kaladan delays are standard examples, compared with China's faster infrastructure delivery.

Myanmar dilemma: after the 2021 military coup, India kept working with the junta for security and connectivity, which raised questions about democratic values; ethnic violence in Manipur since 2023 and refugee flows have added strain.

Realist view: Act East is mainly about balancing China in partnership with Japan, the US and Southeast Asian states that share concerns over the South China Sea.

Liberal view: it is primarily about economic integration and connectivity, with security as a support; RCEP exit weakens this side.

Constructivist view: shared Buddhist and civilisational heritage, such as India's support for restoring temples in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, builds a common Asian identity.

7. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: define Look East, give the three phases in one line each, and list two achievements and two gaps of Act East.

20-mark answer: context of 1991, phases with milestones, the Northeast and connectivity dimension, the Indo-Pacific and Quad, a critique section (trade deficit, RCEP, delays, Myanmar) and a conclusion on ASEAN centrality.

Keywords: ASEAN centrality, extended neighbourhood, connectivity, Indo-Pacific, SAGAR, Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Usable idea: describe Act East as moving from Look to Act, that is from economic engagement to strategic partnership; this framing comes from the government's own 2014 announcement.

Linkage: connect this topic with SAARC and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal as the bridge) and with India-Japan and India-China relations in Chapter 16.

1. Why South Asia Struggles to Cooperate

Colonial legacy: the Partition of 1947 and lines drawn by the British (Radcliffe Line, McMahon Line, Durand Line) left divided peoples, divided rivers and disputed borders.

Shared identities across borders: Bengalis, Tamils, Punjabis, Pashtuns, Nagas and Madhesis live on both sides of borders, so ethnic politics in one country affects another.

Asymmetry: India's size makes smaller neighbours fear domination; India in turn fears neighbours being used by China or Pakistan against it.

Security complex: Barry Buzan's idea of a regional security complex, in which the security of states is so linked that it cannot be considered separately, is often applied to South Asia.

2. River Water Disputes

Indus Waters Treaty (1960): signed by Nehru and Ayub Khan with World Bank mediation; the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) were given to India and the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) mainly to Pakistan, with limited Indian rights for run-of-river hydropower and other uses.

Disputes under the treaty: Pakistan objected to Indian projects such as Baglihar, Kishenganga and Ratle; the Kishenganga case went to a Court of Arbitration, which in 2013 largely allowed India's project.

Recent change: India sought modification of the treaty in 2023 and, after the Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025, announced that it would hold the treaty in abeyance; this ended the treaty's record as a rare survivor of India-Pakistan wars.

Ganga and Farakka: the Farakka Barrage (commissioned 1975) diverted water to keep Kolkata port navigable and became a long dispute with Bangladesh; the Ganga Water Treaty of 1996, signed for 30 years, shares the lean-season flow at Farakka.

Teesta: a sharing agreement was ready in 2011 but was not signed because of opposition from the West Bengal government, a clear case of federal politics shaping foreign policy.

Nepal: the Kosi (1954) and Gandak (1959) agreements are seen in Nepal as unequal; the Mahakali Treaty (1996) envisaged the Pancheshwar multipurpose project, which is still not built.

Bhutan, a success: India-built hydropower projects such as Chukha, Tala and Mangdechhu supply electricity to India and are a major source of Bhutan's revenue.

Brahmaputra and China: China is the upper riparian; India and China have only expert-level talks and memoranda on sharing flood-season data, with no water-sharing treaty, and Chinese dam building on the Yarlung Tsangpo worries India and Bangladesh.

Theory: river disputes show the upper and lower riparian problem; international water law (the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, to which India is not a party) stresses equitable and reasonable use and no significant harm.

3. Illegal Cross-Border Migration

Bangladesh to India: migration into Assam, West Bengal and Tripura, driven by population pressure, poverty, floods and earlier by the 1971 war, has changed demographics and sparked political movements.

Assam Accord (1985): ended the Assam agitation and set 24 March 1971 as the cut-off date for detecting foreigners.

Sarbananda Sonowal v Union of India (2005): the Supreme Court struck down the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983, holding that large-scale illegal migration amounted to external aggression under Article 355.

NRC and CAA: the updated National Register of Citizens in Assam (final list 2019) left out about 19 lakh people; the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 caused concern in Bangladesh, which denies that large-scale illegal migration exists.

Rohingya: the 2017 crisis in Myanmar's Rakhine state drove most Rohingya into Bangladesh, and some into India; India treats them as illegal migrants and a security concern, not as refugees, as it has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Myanmar border: the Free Movement Regime let border tribes move about 16 km into each other's territory; India decided in 2024 to end it and fence the border, citing infiltration and the Manipur violence, which Mizoram and Nagaland opposed.

Nepal, the open border: the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship allows free movement, a source of close ties but also of concerns over crime, trafficking and misuse by hostile agencies.

4. Ethnic Conflicts and Insurgencies

Sri Lankan Tamils: the civil war (1983-2009) drew India in through the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka's Constitution (provincial councils) and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-1990), which suffered heavy losses and was withdrawn.

Lesson: the IPKF experience made India wary of military intervention in neighbours' ethnic conflicts; Tamil Nadu politics continues to shape India's Sri Lanka policy.

Nepal's Madhesis: after Nepal's 2015 constitution, Madhesi groups protested at under-representation; the disruption of supplies at the border was seen in Nepal as an Indian blockade, which India denied, and it pushed Nepal towards China.

Northeast insurgencies: groups such as ULFA, NSCN factions and Manipuri outfits used camps in Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar; cooperation by neighbours is essential for India's internal security.

Neighbours' help: Bhutan's army flushed out Indian insurgent camps in Operation All Clear (2003); Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina handed over several ULFA leaders after 2009; the Indian Army struck insurgent camps across the Myanmar border in 2015.

Cross-border terrorism from Pakistan: support to militancy in Punjab in the 1980s and Jammu and Kashmir since 1989 is India's biggest objection to regional cooperation; India responded with surgical strikes (2016), the Balakot air strike (2019) and Operation Sindoor (May 2025).

Political change in Bangladesh: the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in August 2024 strained India-Bangladesh ties and raised concerns about minorities and security cooperation, showing how dependent cooperation is on particular regimes.

5. Border Disputes

Pakistan: Kashmir and the Line of Control (formalised by the Simla Agreement, 1972), Siachen glacier (Indian control since 1984) and Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch.

China: about 3,488 km of undemarcated Line of Actual Control, Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh, and Indian claims on Aksai Chin; clashes at Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020) followed earlier agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013.

Nepal: Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura are claimed by both; Nepal issued a new political map including them in 2020 and amended its constitution to adopt it.

Bangladesh, a settlement: the Land Boundary Agreement (1974) and its 2011 protocol were implemented in 2015 through the 100th Constitutional Amendment, exchanging 111 Indian enclaves and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves; a 2014 arbitral award settled the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal, and India accepted it.

Sri Lanka: the 1974 and 1976 maritime agreements recognised Katchatheevu as Sri Lankan; fishing by Tamil Nadu fishermen in Sri Lankan waters remains a recurring irritant.

Afghanistan-Pakistan: the Durand Line is not accepted by Afghanistan, which adds to regional instability.

6. Ways Forward and Debates

Basin-level approach: experts propose managing rivers by basin (for example the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin) with data sharing, flood forecasting and joint hydropower, rather than as zero-sum bilateral disputes.

Border management: fencing, smart borders and integrated check posts reduce illegal movement while easing legal trade; work permits for migrant labour are suggested by some scholars as a humane alternative.

Gujral Doctrine logic: generosity without reciprocity towards smaller neighbours builds trust; the LBA and the Ganga treaty (both signed in non-reciprocal spirit) are examples.

Realist objection: realists argue that as long as Pakistan uses terrorism as state policy and China competes for influence, security will dominate and integration will remain limited.

Federal consultation: involving border states (West Bengal on Teesta, Tamil Nadu on fishermen, Mizoram on Myanmar) early can prevent domestic vetoes.

7. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: pick the impediment asked, give two country examples with dates, one success story, and one line on the way forward.

20-mark answer: introduce with the regional security complex idea, take each of the four impediments with examples, show links between them (migration and ethnic politics, rivers and federalism), include successes, and conclude with sub-regional and basin-level solutions.

Keywords: upper and lower riparian, equitable use, cut-off date, enclaves, regional security complex, cross-border terrorism, non-reciprocity.

Usable line: after the Pahalgam attack the Indian government stated that blood and water cannot flow together, words Prime Minister Modi had first used in 2016 after the Uri attack; use it to show how security now shapes water diplomacy.

1. Core ideas: Neighbourhood First

Neighbourhood First is the Modi government's policy, signalled when the leaders of all SAARC countries were invited to the swearing-in of May 2014; it gives priority to the immediate neighbours in connectivity, trade, development aid and crisis response.

It builds on the Gujral Doctrine (1996-97), under which India would give and accommodate without asking for reciprocity from smaller neighbours, would not allow its territory to be used against them, and would respect their sovereignty and avoid interference.

It links with SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region, 2015), widened in 2025 as MAHASAGAR, and with Act East, because Bangladesh and Myanmar are India's land bridges to South-East Asia.

The structural problem: India is larger than all its South Asian neighbours combined in area, population and economy, and shares land or maritime boundaries with almost all of them, while they mostly do not border one another; smaller states therefore fear Indian dominance and invite outside powers, chiefly China, to balance it.

China's role across the region rests on the Belt and Road Initiative, infrastructure loans, arms supplies and diplomatic support; Indian strategists worry about a ring of Chinese-built ports and debt dependence around India, often described by the term string of pearls, which comes from US strategic writing rather than official Chinese policy.

2. Pakistan

Founding disputes: Partition and Kashmir's accession (October 1947) led to wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 and the Kargil conflict (1999); the Tashkent Declaration (1966) restored pre-war positions after 1965.

Simla Agreement (2 July 1972): signed by Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after the 1971 war; the two countries agreed to settle differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations, and the ceasefire line of December 1971 in Jammu and Kashmir became the Line of Control, which neither side would alter unilaterally; India relies on it to reject third-party mediation.

Indus Waters Treaty (1960): signed at Karachi by Nehru and Ayub Khan with World Bank mediation; the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) go to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) mainly to Pakistan, with India allowed limited uses such as run-of-the-river hydropower; a Permanent Indus Commission handles questions.

The treaty survived three wars, but India sought its modification in January 2023, and after the Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025 India declared the treaty held in abeyance until Pakistan credibly ends support for cross-border terrorism.

Cycles of engagement and crisis: the Lahore Declaration (1999), Agra summit (2001), Composite Dialogue (from 2004) and Kartarpur corridor (2019) alternated with terror attacks: Parliament (2001), Mumbai (2008), Pathankot (January 2016), Uri (September 2016, followed by surgical strikes), Pulwama (February 2019, followed by the Balakot air strike) and Pahalgam (2025, followed by Operation Sindoor in May 2025).

Pathankot shift (2016 question): Prime Minister Modi's unscheduled stop at Lahore in December 2015 was followed days later by the Pathankot airbase attack; India even allowed a Pakistani joint investigation team to visit the base, but the lack of action against the planners hardened India's line that terror and talks cannot go together, and after Uri India moved to punitive military responses.

After August 2019 (changes to Article 370) Pakistan downgraded diplomatic ties and suspended trade; India had already withdrawn Most Favoured Nation treatment after Pulwama.

China factor: China is Pakistan's main arms supplier and diplomatic shield; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship of the Belt and Road, passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which India rejects as a violation of its sovereignty, and India must prepare for a two-front challenge.

India's options: deterrence by punishment, diplomatic isolation of terror (Pakistan was on the FATF grey list from 2018 to 2022), management of the Line of Control, people-to-people links such as Kartarpur, and dialogue only when terror ends.

3. Bangladesh

1971 legacy: India's role in Bangladesh's liberation made it a natural partner, and ties were closest under Sheikh Hasina (2009-2024), whose government acted against Northeast insurgent groups operating from Bangladesh.

Land Boundary Agreement (2026 question): the 1974 Indira-Mujib agreement and its 2011 Protocol were implemented through the 100th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2015: India transferred 111 enclaves to Bangladesh and received 51, adverse possessions were adjusted, about 6.1 km of undemarcated border was settled, enclave residents chose their citizenship, and the exchange took effect on 31 July 2015.

The amendment was needed because the Supreme Court, in the Berubari Union reference (1960), had held that ceding Indian territory requires a constitutional amendment under Article 368; the agreement ended one of the world's most complex enclave problems and improved border management.

Maritime boundary: settled in 2014 by an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS, which awarded Bangladesh most of the disputed sea area; India accepted the award, showing respect for international law.

Water: the Ganga Water Treaty (1996) on sharing at Farakka runs for 30 years and is due for renewal in 2026; the Teesta sharing agreement, ready in 2011, stalled because of objections from West Bengal.

Connectivity and trade: Bangladesh is India's largest trading partner in South Asia; projects include the Maitri Setu bridge (2021), the Akhaura-Agartala rail link, cross-border electricity supply and access to Chittagong and Mongla ports for the Northeast.

Irritants: illegal migration, killings at the border, rhetoric around the National Register of Citizens in Assam, and cattle and drug smuggling.

2024 change: Sheikh Hasina resigned and left for India in August 2024 after mass protests; the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus has been cooler towards India, has sought her return, and attacks on minorities became a concern in New Delhi.

China factor (2025 question): China is Bangladesh's largest trading partner and main arms supplier (including two submarines delivered in 2016), Bangladesh joined the Belt and Road in 2016, and China has shown interest in managing the Teesta river; during a visit to China in March 2025 Yunus described India's Northeast as landlocked and Bangladesh as the region's access to the sea, which alarmed New Delhi, and in April 2025 India withdrew a transshipment facility for Bangladeshi exports.

India's options: engage all political forces rather than one party, deliver on the Teesta and humane border management, keep economic interdependence in power, ports and rail, and use BIMSTEC and the BBIN framework for regional connectivity.

4. Nepal

1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship: provides an open border, national treatment for each other's citizens in residence, property, trade and employment, and consultation on threats to security; many in Nepal see it as unequal, and an Eminent Persons Group (2016-2018) was formed to review relations, but its report has not been formally accepted.

Strains: India's perceived role in the 2015 border blockade during Madhesi protests against Nepal's new Constitution pushed Kathmandu towards China; in May 2020, after India opened a road to Lipulekh on the Kailash Mansarovar route, Nepal issued a new political map showing Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura as Nepali and amended its Constitution in June 2020 to adopt it; India called the claim an untenable, artificial enlargement.

Roots of the map dispute (2020 question): the Treaty of Sugauli (1816) made the Kali (Mahakali) river the boundary, and the two sides disagree on which stream is its source; the dispute is open to dialogue, but nationalism in Nepal and the security value of the Lipulekh pass make compromise hard.

Cooperation: the Mahakali Treaty (1996, Pancheshwar project), electricity trade (India agreed in 2024 to import 10,000 MW from Nepal over ten years), the Motihari-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline (2019), rail links, and Gorkha soldiers in the Indian Army, though recruitment from Nepal stalled after the Agnipath scheme (2022).

China factor: a transit and transport agreement (2016), a Belt and Road MoU (2017) and a framework for Belt and Road cooperation (December 2024), plans for a trans-Himalayan railway, and growing Chinese aid and investment.

India's options: address the boundary through talks, deliver projects quickly, avoid being seen to interfere in Nepal's politics, and build on cultural ties (Ramayana and Buddhist circuits, open border, shared festivals).

5. Bhutan

Treaties (2017 question): under the 1949 treaty of perpetual peace and friendship Bhutan agreed to be guided by India's advice in external relations; the revised 2007 Treaty of Friendship dropped this clause, committing both to cooperate closely on national interests and not to allow their territory to be used against the other's security, and allowing Bhutan to import arms as long as they pose no danger to India.

Hydropower partnership: India built the Chukha, Kurichhu, Tala and Mangdechhu projects and buys Bhutan's surplus electricity, a model of mutual benefit; India is Bhutan's largest trade and development partner.

Doklam (2017): a 73-day standoff when Indian troops stopped a Chinese road on the Doklam plateau, claimed by Bhutan, close to the Siliguri Corridor (the Chicken's Neck).

China-Bhutan boundary talks (2024 question): held since 1984; a three-step roadmap MoU was signed in 2021; China has built villages in areas Bhutan claims, and any swap that gives China Doklam would threaten the Siliguri Corridor; Bhutan has no formal diplomatic relations with China.

Does the treaty need revision? The 2007 revision already removed the guidance clause; some want clearer obligations on security, hydropower tariffs and debt, while others say flexibility respects Bhutan's sovereignty; India's best option is to support Bhutan's economy (hydropower, Gelephu Mindfulness City, rail links, five-year plan funding) so that Thimphu has no need to tilt towards Beijing.

6. Sri Lanka

Tamil question: the India-Sri Lanka Accord (1987) of Rajiv Gandhi and J.R. Jayewardene led to the 13th Amendment (provincial councils) and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-90); India still urges full implementation of the 13th Amendment.

Kachchatheevu: a small, uninhabited island in the Palk Strait; the 1974 agreement (Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike) drew the maritime boundary placing it on the Sri Lankan side, while allowing Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit it (to dry nets and attend the St Anthony's church festival) without travel documents; the 1976 exchange of letters on the Gulf of Mannar and Bay of Bengal provided that fishermen of each country would not fish in the other's waters.

Why it remains intractable (2026 question): Tamil Nadu parties argue that the island was given away without a constitutional amendment (invoking the Berubari principle) and have approached the Supreme Court; the Union government has held that it was disputed territory, not ceded Indian land; the deeper problem is fishermen crossing the boundary, arrests by the Sri Lankan Navy and damage to Sri Lankan fisheries by Indian bottom trawlers, so a livelihood dispute keeps a settled boundary alive in politics.

China factor (2024 question): the Hambantota port was leased to a Chinese company for 99 years in 2017 after debt problems, China financed Colombo Port City, and Chinese research and tracking vessels (such as Yuan Wang 5 in 2022) docked in Sri Lanka, after which Sri Lanka imposed a temporary moratorium on research vessels.

India as first responder: during the 2022 economic crisis India provided about 4 billion US dollars in credit lines, currency swaps and deferred payments, more than any other country in that phase; it also supports energy projects in Trincomalee and port development in Colombo.

Recent ties: President Anura Kumara Dissanayake made his first state visit abroad to India (December 2024), and during Prime Minister Modi's visit in April 2025 the two countries signed their first defence cooperation MoU.

India's options: sustainable fisheries (deep-sea fishing, phasing out bottom trawling, regular joint working group talks), economic integration (power grid link, ferries, UPI), and steady support for Tamil rights without interference.

7. Maldives

Foundations: diplomatic relations since 1965 (sixty years in 2025); India's Operation Cactus (1988) foiled a coup against President Gayoom, and India was first to respond to the 2004 tsunami, the 2014 Male water crisis (Operation Neer) and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Strategic location: the atolls lie next to major Indian Ocean sea lanes; India has supplied coastal radars and aircraft for medical evacuation, and is building the Greater Male Connectivity Project.

Swings: under Abdulla Yameen (2013-18) the Maldives joined the Belt and Road, signed a free trade agreement with China and took Chinese loans (the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge); under Ibrahim Solih (2018-23) it followed an India First policy; Mohamed Muizzu won in 2023 on an India Out campaign, and Indian military personnel operating Indian aircraft were replaced by civilians in 2024.

Repair: facing a debt crunch, Muizzu made a state visit to India in October 2024; India extended currency swap support, and the two adopted a vision for a Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership.

Factors to evaluate (2026 question): geography and sea-lane security, Maldivian dependence on India for food, medicine and construction materials, tourism, debt and Chinese loans, domestic politics and religious radicalisation, and India's record as first responder; India's options are patient, non-partisan engagement and visible people-centred projects.

8. Myanmar

Land bridge to the East: India shares a border of about 1,643 km with Myanmar across four Northeastern states; key projects are the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (Sittwe port began operations in 2023) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway.

Free Movement Regime (FMR): allowed people of border tribes to move up to 16 km on either side without visas, reflecting ethnic ties (Nagas, Kuki-Chin-Mizo peoples); after the Manipur violence of 2023 and concerns over insurgents and drugs, the government announced in 2024 that it would scrap the FMR and fence the whole border, a move opposed by Mizoram and Nagaland.

Coup and conflict: after the military coup of February 2021 India kept engaging the junta for security reasons while calling for a return to democracy; civil war has pushed refugees into Mizoram and Manipur, the Rohingya crisis (2017) tests India's balance between Myanmar and Bangladesh, and India sent relief under Operation Brahma after the March 2025 earthquake.

China factor: the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port give China access to the Bay of Bengal, and China has influence over ethnic armed groups along its border.

India's options: quiet engagement with all actors (junta, ethnic armed organisations, opposition), border security that protects tribal ties, completion of Kaladan, and cooperation through BIMSTEC and ASEAN.

9. Using it in the exam

10-mark answer: open with the basis of the relationship (geography, history, treaty), give three or four areas of cooperation and two or three irritants including the China factor, and end with a forward-looking line such as Neighbourhood First or SAGAR.

15/20-mark answer: add a short timeline, India's interests, the neighbour's own view (asymmetry, sovereignty concerns), China's role with named projects, and concrete options for India.

Keywords: Neighbourhood First, Gujral Doctrine, asymmetry, non-reciprocity, connectivity, debt-trap concerns, hedging by small states, first responder, strategic autonomy.

Quotation: Atal Bihari Vajpayee's often-quoted remark that one can change friends but not neighbours captures why engagement must continue even in bad times.