The Constitution and the Organs of Government — UPSC PSIR Optional Notes

1. The Preamble

Source: based on Nehru's Objectives Resolution (adopted 22 January 1947); it opens with We, the People of India, locating sovereignty in the people.

Nature of the state: Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic; the words socialist and secular, and integrity in the unity clause, were added by the 42nd Amendment (1976).

Objectives: justice (social, economic, political), liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship), equality (of status and opportunity), and fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation.

Descriptions: K.M. Munshi called it the political horoscope of the republic; N.A. Palkhivala described it as the identity card of the Constitution; Ernest Barker reproduced it at the start of his Principles of Social and Political Theory (1951).

Is it part of the Constitution: In re Berubari (1960) said it is not; Kesavananda Bharati (1973) held that it is part of the Constitution and a key to its basic structure, though it is not a source of power and is not enforceable by itself.

2024 challenge: in November 2024 the Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging the 1976 insertion of socialist and secular, holding that Parliament's amending power extends to the Preamble.

2. Fundamental Rights: Structure and Philosophy

Six groups: equality (Articles 14–18), freedom (19–22), against exploitation (23–24), freedom of religion (25–28), cultural and educational rights (29–30), and constitutional remedies (32).

Right to property: originally Articles 19(1)(f) and 31; removed from Part III by the 44th Amendment (1978) and made a legal right under Article 300A.

Theoretical basis: mainly negative liberty in Isaiah Berlin's sense, limits on the state, but some rights, such as Articles 15(4), 17, 21A and 23, demand positive action and bind private actors too.

State under Article 12: courts expanded the meaning of state to include bodies under government control, using tests from cases such as Ajay Hasia (1981).

Article 13: laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are void to that extent, which is the textual basis of judicial review.

Article 32: Ambedkar called it the very soul and heart of the Constitution, because a right without a remedy is meaningless; writs include habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto.

3. Expansion of Rights by the Courts

Article 21: from the narrow reading in A.K. Gopalan (1950) to Maneka Gandhi (1978), where procedure must be fair, just and reasonable and Articles 14, 19 and 21 are linked, the so-called golden triangle.

New rights read into Article 21: livelihood (Olga Tellis, 1985), speedy trial (Hussainara Khatoon, 1979), clean environment, education (Unnikrishnan, 1993, later Article 21A by the 86th Amendment, 2002), and privacy (K.S. Puttaswamy, 2017, nine judges).

Equality: Indra Sawhney (1992) upheld OBC reservation with a 50 percent ceiling and the creamy-layer exclusion; Janhit Abhiyan (2022) upheld the 103rd Amendment (2019) on reservation for economically weaker sections.

Dignity and autonomy: Navtej Singh Johar (2018) decriminalised consensual same-sex relations; Shayara Bano (2017) set aside instant triple talaq; Joseph Shine (2018) struck down the adultery offence.

Limits: Article 19(2)–(6) reasonable restrictions; preventive detention under Article 22; suspension of enforcement during Emergency (Articles 358, 359), though the 44th Amendment protected Articles 20 and 21 from suspension.

4. Directive Principles of State Policy

Source: inspired by the Irish Constitution (1937), which drew on Spanish practice; Article 37 declares them non-justiciable but fundamental in the governance of the country.

Socialist principles: Article 38 (social order of justice, reducing inequality), Article 39 (adequate livelihood, distribution of resources, equal pay, prevention of concentration of wealth), Article 39A (legal aid), Article 41, 42, 43 (living wage).

Gandhian principles: Article 40 (village panchayats), Article 43 (cottage industries), Article 46 (weaker sections), Article 47 (prohibition), Article 48 (cow protection).

Liberal-intellectual principles: Article 44 (uniform civil code), Article 45 (early childhood care), Article 48A (environment, added 1976), Article 50 (separation of judiciary from executive), Article 51 (international peace).

Debate in the Assembly: K.T. Shah is often quoted as calling them a cheque on a bank payable when the resources of the bank permit; Ambedkar replied that they were instruments of instruction and that voters would hold governments to them.

Implementation: land reforms, the 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992), the Legal Services Authorities Act (1987), MGNREGA (2005) and the Right to Education Act (2009) all give effect to Directive Principles.

Uniform civil code: Shah Bano (1985) urged it; Uttarakhand enacted its own Uniform Civil Code in 2024, which came into force in January 2025, reviving the debate on Article 44.

5. The Relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles

Phase of conflict: State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan (1951) held that DPSPs must yield to Fundamental Rights, which led to the First Amendment and Article 15(4).

Parliament's response: the 25th Amendment (1971) added Article 31C, protecting laws giving effect to Article 39(b) and (c) from challenge under Articles 14 and 19; the 42nd Amendment tried to extend this to all DPSPs.

Harmony: Minerva Mills (1980) struck down the 42nd Amendment's extension and held that harmony and balance between Parts III and IV is itself a basic feature.

DPSPs as interpretive aid: courts now use DPSPs to give content to rights, for example Article 39A in legal aid and Article 47 in reading health into Article 21.

Article 39(b) in 2024: a nine-judge bench in Property Owners Association (November 2024) held that not all private property is a material resource of the community, departing from Justice Krishna Iyer's wide reading in Ranganatha Reddy (1977).

6. Fundamental Duties

Origin: added as Article 51A (Part IVA) by the 42nd Amendment (1976) on the recommendation of the Swaran Singh Committee; the idea is often linked to the Soviet Constitution.

Content: ten duties in 1976 (respect the Constitution, flag and anthem, protect sovereignty, promote harmony, protect the environment, develop scientific temper, and so on); an eleventh, for parents to provide education to children aged six to fourteen, was added by the 86th Amendment (2002).

Status: not directly enforceable, but courts have used them to interpret laws, and the Justice J.S. Verma Committee (1999) identified existing laws that give effect to them.

Debate: supporters see duties as the moral counterpart of rights, in line with Gandhi's view that rights flow from duties well performed; critics fear that a duties discourse can be used to dilute rights, especially since they were added during the Emergency.

7. Theoretical Links

Rights theories: Part III reflects the liberal natural-rights tradition (Locke) and the idea of rights as trumps (Dworkin); Part IV reflects welfare liberalism and social rights (T.H. Marshall's social citizenship).

Rawls: the priority of basic liberties in Part III and the concern for the least advantaged in Articles 38, 39 and 46 can be read through Rawls's two principles of justice.

Generations of rights: civil-political (Part III), socio-economic (Part IV) and collective or environmental rights (Article 48A, 51A(g)), now partly enforceable through Article 21.

8. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: define the provision with its article, give its philosophical basis, cite one landmark case, and conclude on its significance.

20-mark answer: introduction with the conscience of the Constitution; body tracing the conflict-to-harmony journey (Champakam, Golaknath, Kesavananda, Minerva Mills) with examples of DPSPs implemented; a critique; conclusion on transformative constitutionalism.

Keywords: justiciable, golden triangle, harmonious construction, transformative constitutionalism, positive and negative liberty, socio-economic rights, constitutional morality.

Quotation: Austin describes Parts III and IV together as the conscience of the Constitution.

Quotation: Ambedkar called Article 32 the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it.

1. Core Ideas: Parliamentary Government

Definition: a system in which the real executive (Prime Minister and Council of Ministers) is part of the legislature and stays in office only while it has the confidence of the lower house.

Features: nominal and real executive, fusion of executive and legislature, collective responsibility, individual responsibility, leadership of the Prime Minister, political homogeneity of the cabinet, and dissolution of the lower house.

Walter Bagehot: in The English Constitution (1867) he called the cabinet the efficient secret of the system, a hyphen that joins and a buckle that fastens the executive and legislative parts, and distinguished dignified parts (monarchy) from efficient parts (cabinet).

Indian provisions: Article 74 (Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President), Article 75 (appointment, collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha), Article 78 (duties of the Prime Minister to inform the President), and parallel Articles 163 and 164 for the states.

2. Why India Chose the Parliamentary System

Ambedkar's argument (4 November 1948): a democratic executive must be both stable and responsible; the American system gives more stability, the British more responsibility; the Draft Constitution preferred more responsibility, assessed daily through questions, motions and debates, to more stability.

Familiarity: Indians had worked parliamentary institutions since 1919 and in the provincial ministries of 1937; the Assembly saw no reason to experiment.

Diversity: a cabinet can include many regions and groups, while a single elected president might represent one majority.

Fear of conflict: a separately elected executive and legislature could deadlock, as in the US, which the Assembly thought dangerous in a new nation.

Differences from Britain: India has a written constitution, an elected (indirectly) President instead of a hereditary monarch, judicial review, a federal structure and limits on parliamentary sovereignty.

3. How the System Has Worked

Cabinet to prime-ministerial government: Richard Crossman's 1963 introduction to Bagehot argued that cabinet government had become prime-ministerial; in India this is visible under Nehru, more sharply under Indira Gandhi, and in the centrality of the Prime Minister's Office since 2014.

Coalition era (1989–2014): collective responsibility was tested by coalition partners; coordination committees and common minimum programmes became tools of governance, and the Prime Minister became a manager of allies.

President's position: the 42nd Amendment (1976) made ministerial advice binding; the 44th Amendment (1978) allowed the President to return advice once for reconsideration.

Anti-defection law: the Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985; tightened by the 91st Amendment, 2003) stabilised governments but reduced the independence of MPs; Kihoto Hollohan (1992) upheld it while making the Speaker's decision subject to judicial review.

Decline of deliberation: fewer sitting days than in the 1950s, frequent disruptions, bills passed with little debate or committee scrutiny, and wider use of ordinances and money bill certification.

Strengths: peaceful transfers of power after every general election, including 1977, 1989, 1996, 2004 and 2014, show the system's legitimacy.

4. The Parliamentary versus Presidential Debate

Case for a presidential system: stability, a directly elected leader with a national mandate, freedom to choose experts as ministers, and an end to coalition bargaining; this argument was revived during periods of instability in the 1970s and the 1990s.

Case against: risk of authoritarianism in a diverse country, majoritarian winner-takes-all politics, executive-legislature deadlock, and the weakening of federal and minority voices.

Juan Linz: in The Perils of Presidentialism (1990) he argued that presidential systems are more prone to breakdown because of dual legitimacy and rigid terms, which supports India's choice.

NCRWC (2002): the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, chaired by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, did not recommend a change to the presidential form and suggested reforms within the parliamentary system instead.

5. Amendment Procedures: Article 368

Simple majority (outside Article 368): provisions such as Articles 2, 3 and 4 (new states, boundaries), Article 169 (creation or abolition of legislative councils), Article 239A, quorum, salaries and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules can be changed by ordinary law, and these are expressly not treated as amendments under Article 368.

Special majority: a majority of the total membership of each House and two-thirds of members present and voting, required for most provisions, including Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.

Special majority plus ratification: for federal provisions, ratification by the legislatures of at least half the states is needed: election of the President (Articles 54, 55), extent of Union and state executive power (73, 162), the Supreme Court and High Courts, distribution of legislative powers, the lists in the Seventh Schedule, representation of states in Parliament, and Article 368 itself.

Procedure: a bill can be introduced only in Parliament (not in state legislatures), by a minister or a private member, without the President's prior permission; each House must pass it separately, there is no joint sitting, and the President must give assent (made obligatory by the 24th Amendment, 1971).

Article 368(1): inserted by the 24th Amendment (1971) after Golaknath, it states that Parliament may, in exercise of its constituent power, amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of the Constitution.

Scale of use: the most recent amendment as of mid-2025 is the 106th (2023), which reserves one-third of seats in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies for women, to take effect after the next census and delimitation.

6. Rigidity, Flexibility and Limits

Wheare's classification: for K.C. Wheare, constitutions are rigid if they need special procedures and flexible if ordinary law can change them; India's Constitution is partly rigid and partly flexible.

Ambedkar's defence: he argued that the Constitution was neither too rigid nor too flexible, and that the easy procedure for many provisions answered the charge that it bound future generations.

Comparison: the US Constitution needs two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and three-fourths of the states and has only 27 amendments; Britain has no codified constitution and Parliament can change constitutional law by ordinary statute.

Judicial limits: from Shankari Prasad (1951) to Kesavananda Bharati (1973) the question became whether Parliament can amend any part; Kesavananda held that it can amend any provision but cannot destroy the basic structure, and Minerva Mills (1980) struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 inserted in 1976.

Critique: some argue that frequent amendments show constitutional instability and executive dominance (the 39th and 42nd Amendments of the Emergency); others see them as the Constitution's capacity to adapt, for example the 73rd, 74th and 101st (GST) Amendments.

7. Indian Context and Theory

Constituent and amending power: theorists distinguish the original constituent power of the people from the derived amending power of Parliament; the basic structure doctrine rests on this distinction.

Ambedkar on amendment: he quoted Jefferson's view that each generation is a distinct nation with a right to make its own law, to argue against an unamendable constitution.

Simultaneous elections: the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024, introduced to enable simultaneous elections and referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee, raises questions about how the parliamentary principle of responsibility fits fixed terms.

8. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: define the parliamentary system, give Ambedkar's responsibility-versus-stability reason, two Indian features and one challenge (anti-defection or decline of debate).

20-mark answer: for amendment questions, introduce Article 368 and the rigid-flexible blend; explain the three methods with examples; trace the judicial journey to the basic structure; evaluate with examples of good and controversial amendments; conclude that India has a flexible but limited amending power.

Keywords: collective responsibility, Westminster model, prime-ministerial government, constituent power, special majority, ratification, basic structure, rigidity and flexibility.

Quotation: Bagehot described the cabinet as a hyphen which joins and a buckle which fastens the legislative and executive parts of the state.

Quotation (paraphrase): Ambedkar argued that the Draft Constitution, in recommending the parliamentary system, preferred more responsibility to more stability.

1. Core Ideas

Judicial review: the power of courts to examine the constitutional validity of legislation, executive action and, in India, constitutional amendments, and to declare them void if they violate the Constitution.

Origin: Marbury v Madison (1803), where Chief Justice John Marshall held that it is the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, established judicial review in the USA although the US Constitution does not mention it expressly.

Constitutional supremacy: judicial review follows from a written constitution that is higher law, in contrast to the British doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty described by A.V. Dicey.

Basic structure: the doctrine that certain essential features of the Constitution lie beyond the amending power of Parliament because they define the identity of the Constitution itself.

2. Judicial Review in the Indian Constitution

Textual basis: Article 13 (laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are void), Article 32 (Supreme Court writs), Article 226 (High Court writs), Articles 131–136 (original and appellate jurisdiction), and Articles 245–254 (federal distribution of powers).

Scope: Indian courts review on grounds of violation of Fundamental Rights, lack of legislative competence, violation of other constitutional provisions, and, for amendments, violation of the basic structure.

Procedure established by law: Article 21 used this phrase, influenced by the Japanese Constitution and B.N. Rau's talks with Justice Frankfurter, to avoid the American due process clause; Maneka Gandhi (1978) effectively brought substantive fairness back in.

Judicial review is itself basic structure: Minerva Mills (1980) and L. Chandra Kumar (1997) held that the power of judicial review under Articles 32 and 226 cannot be taken away even by amendment.

3. The Road to Kesavananda

Shankari Prasad (1951): upheld the First Amendment, holding that amendments under Article 368 are not law under Article 13, so Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights.

Sajjan Singh (1965): followed Shankari Prasad, but Justices Hidayatullah and Mudholkar doubted whether Fundamental Rights could be freely abridged; Mudholkar asked whether basic features of the Constitution could be changed.

Golaknath (1967): an eleven-judge bench led by Chief Justice Subba Rao held by 6:5 that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights, applying the doctrine of prospective overruling.

Parliament's response: the 24th Amendment (1971) affirmed Parliament's power to amend any part, including Part III; the 25th added Article 31C; the 29th placed Kerala land reform laws in the Ninth Schedule.

An intellectual source: the German jurist Dieter Conrad's 1965 lecture in India on implied limits to the amending power was cited in argument and shaped the idea of basic features.

4. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973)

Bench: thirteen judges, the largest in the Court's history, decided on 24 April 1973 by a 7:6 majority; Chief Justice S.M. Sikri presided.

Holding: Golaknath was overruled, so Parliament can amend any provision including Fundamental Rights, but it cannot alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.

Justice Khanna: H.R. Khanna's separate opinion was decisive; he agreed that Fundamental Rights could be amended but held that the basic structure could not be destroyed.

Features named by judges: supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic form of government, secular character, separation of powers, federal character, the dignity and freedom of the individual, and the unity and integrity of the nation.

Aftermath: the supersession of three senior judges in the appointment of Chief Justice A.N. Ray (April 1973) was widely seen as the government's reaction to the judgment.

5. Development of the Doctrine

Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain (1975): struck down clause (4) of Article 329A, inserted by the 39th Amendment to protect the Prime Minister's election, as violating free and fair elections and the rule of law.

Minerva Mills (1980): struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 and the extension of Article 31C; limited amending power and the balance between Parts III and IV are basic features.

Waman Rao (1981): held that the doctrine applies to amendments made after 24 April 1973, the date of Kesavananda.

Bommai case (1994): held secularism and federalism to be basic features and made President's Rule under Article 356 subject to judicial review.

Coelho case (2007): laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 can be tested against the basic structure, including the rights in Articles 14, 19 and 21.

NJAC case (2015): in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India, the Court struck down the 99th Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission as violating judicial independence, a basic feature.

Other applications: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) struck down paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, and L. Chandra Kumar (1997) restored High Court review over tribunals.

6. Debates and Critiques

Counter-majoritarian difficulty: Alexander Bickel, in The Least Dangerous Branch (1962), asked how unelected judges can override the elected representatives of the people; the basic structure intensifies this since it limits even constitutional amendment.

Waldron's critique: Jeremy Waldron, in The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review (2006), argued that in societies with working democratic institutions, rights disagreements should be settled by legislatures, not courts.

Dworkin's defence: Ronald Dworkin's moral reading of constitutions, developed in Law's Empire (1986) and Freedom's Law (1996), sees courts as forums of principle protecting rights as trumps against majorities.

Indeterminacy: critics note that there is no fixed list of basic features, giving judges wide discretion; supporters reply that the open list is a strength that lets the doctrine respond to new threats.

Democratic defence: supporters argue that the doctrine protects democracy itself from temporary majorities, as the Emergency amendments showed, and that the people's constituent power stands above Parliament's amending power.

Judicial sovereignty: Pratap Bhanu Mehta, in The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty (2007), argued that the Indian Supreme Court has become a powerful governance institution whose authority rests more on public trust than on clear legal principle.

Public debate: in 2023 the Vice-President publicly questioned the doctrine, reviving the old argument over parliamentary versus judicial supremacy.

7. Activism, Restraint and Comparative Spread

Activism and restraint: judicial activism means courts going beyond traditional limits to protect rights or govern (PIL, continuing mandamus), while restraint means deference to legislative and executive choices; Indian courts have shown both, including restraint during the Emergency in ADM Jabalpur (1976).

Upendra Baxi: he described the post-Emergency phase of public interest litigation as social action litigation, an effort by the Court to regain legitimacy by turning to the poor.

Spread abroad: Bangladesh's Supreme Court adopted the basic structure idea in Anwar Hossain Chowdhury (1989), and courts in other countries have cited the Indian doctrine, making it a notable Indian export.

8. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: define judicial review or basic structure, give its constitutional basis, name Kesavananda (1973) and one later case, and give one critique.

20-mark answer: introduction with Marbury or Kesavananda; body tracing the evolution (Shankari Prasad to Coelho and NJAC); a theoretical section on Bickel, Waldron and Dworkin; Indian evaluation (protection during and after the Emergency versus judicial overreach); conclusion on the doctrine as a guardian of constitutional identity.

Keywords: constitutional supremacy, implied limitations, constituent power, counter-majoritarian difficulty, constitutional identity, judicial sovereignty, prospective overruling.

Quotation: Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v Madison held that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.

Quotation: Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 78, called the judiciary the least dangerous branch because it has neither force nor will, but merely judgment.

1. Core Ideas: Envisaged Role versus Actual Working

Envisaged role: what the Constitution's text and the Constituent Assembly debates intended each organ to do.

Actual working: how the organ has functioned in practice, shaped by party systems, personalities, conventions and court judgments.

Why the gap matters: PSIR questions often ask you to compare the two; the gap reveals the difference between formal constitutional design and political reality.

2. The President: Envisaged Role

Constitutional head: Articles 52–62 create the office; the President is elected indirectly by an electoral college of elected members of Parliament and state assemblies (Article 54) and can be removed by impeachment (Article 61).

Ambedkar's view: he explained that the President would occupy the same position as the King under the English constitution, as head of the state but not of the executive, bound by ministerial advice (paraphrase of his speech of 4 November 1948).

Powers in name: executive power of the Union is vested in the President (Article 53), along with the supreme command of the armed forces, pardoning (Article 72), ordinances (Article 123) and emergency powers, all exercised on advice.

Binding advice: Article 74(1) after the 42nd Amendment (1976) says the President shall act in accordance with advice; the 44th Amendment (1978) allows one return for reconsideration.

3. The President: Actual Working

Early friction: Rajendra Prasad differed with Nehru over the Hindu Code Bill and over the President's powers, but ultimately accepted the advice of the cabinet.

Shamsher Singh v State of Punjab (1974): the Supreme Court held that the President and Governors act on the aid and advice of ministers except in narrow situations.

Emergency (1975): President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed signed the proclamation of internal emergency on the Prime Minister's advice before the cabinet had met, a low point for the office.

Pocket veto: President Zail Singh withheld assent to the Indian Post Office (Amendment) Bill (1986) by not acting on it, showing the absence of a time limit for assent.

Hung parliaments: Presidents R. Venkataraman (1989, 1991), Shankar Dayal Sharma (1996) and K.R. Narayanan (1998) exercised judgment in inviting leaders to form governments; Narayanan asked for letters of support to establish a majority.

Returning advice: President Narayanan returned the cabinet's recommendation for President's Rule in Uttar Pradesh in 1997, and the cabinet did not press it.

Verdict: the office has worked largely as designed, a formal head with real influence only in moments of political uncertainty.

4. Prime Minister and Council of Ministers

Envisaged role: Article 75 makes the Prime Minister the head of the Council of Ministers, collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha; Article 78 obliges the Prime Minister to keep the President informed; the 91st Amendment (2003) capped the ministry at 15 percent of the Lok Sabha's strength.

Nehru era: a dominant Prime Minister within a cabinet of strong leaders, with the Congress system (Rajni Kothari) giving internal debate.

Indira Gandhi era: centralisation in the Prime Minister's Secretariat, the 1969 Congress split and the Emergency turned cabinet government into personalised rule.

Coalition era (1989–2014): collective responsibility was negotiated among allies; Prime Ministers such as Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh worked through coordination mechanisms.

Since 2014: single-party majorities and a strong Prime Minister's Office have revived a prime-ministerial style of governance.

Ordinances: Article 123 allows the President to issue ordinances when Parliament is not in session; D.C. Wadhwa's study of re-promulgation in Bihar led to D.C. Wadhwa v State of Bihar (1987), and Krishna Kumar Singh v State of Bihar (2017) held re-promulgation without placing ordinances before the legislature a fraud on the Constitution.

5. Parliament: Envisaged Role

Structure: the President, the Rajya Sabha (up to 250 members, 12 nominated) and the Lok Sabha (543 elected seats at present) under Articles 79–122.

Functions: law-making, control of the executive (questions, motions, no-confidence), financial control (budget, Public Accounts Committee), constituent function (Article 368), electoral functions and deliberation on national issues.

Rajya Sabha: designed as a council of states to represent the federal units and to act as a revising chamber; it has equal powers with the Lok Sabha except on money bills and confidence.

Committee system: financial committees (Public Accounts Committee, since 1921; Estimates; Public Undertakings) and Departmentally Related Standing Committees (since 1993) allow detailed scrutiny away from the floor.

6. Parliament: Actual Working

Fewer sittings: the Lok Sabha sat far more often in the 1950s than in recent decades; disruptions and adjournments reduce question hour and debate.

Less committee scrutiny: the share of bills referred to committees has fallen in recent Lok Sabhas, according to legislative research organisations such as PRS.

Money bill route: certifying bills as money bills bypasses the Rajya Sabha; the Aadhaar Act (2016) was upheld in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar, 2018) over Justice Chandrachud's dissent, and the issue was referred to a larger bench in Rojer Mathew (2019).

Anti-defection law: the Tenth Schedule makes MPs vote on party lines, reducing independent judgment and turning Parliament into a forum for ratifying executive decisions.

Presiding officers: the neutrality of the Speaker in disqualification and money bill decisions is debated; the office of Deputy Speaker remained vacant throughout the 17th Lok Sabha (2019–24).

Positives: landmark laws (RTI 2005, MGNREGA 2005, GST 2017), committee reports that shaped bills, and question hour remain real tools of accountability.

7. Theories and Debates

Bagehot and Crossman: the shift from cabinet to prime-ministerial government is a general trend in Westminster systems, and India fits the pattern.

Morris-Jones: W.H. Morris-Jones, in The Government and Politics of India (1964) he described Indian politics as working through three idioms, modern, traditional and saintly, which explains why formal institutions work differently in practice.

Decline of legislatures: James Bryce in Modern Democracies (1921) already spoke of the decline of legislatures; Indian scholars point to party discipline and executive control of the agenda.

Executive aggrandisement: critics describe the use of ordinances, money bills and the bypassing of committees as a form of executive dominance; defenders reply that a decisive executive is needed for governance.

8. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: state the envisaged role with articles, give two examples of actual working, and conclude on the gap.

20-mark answer: introduction with Ambedkar on the President or Bagehot on the cabinet; body comparing envisaged and actual roles of President, Prime Minister and Parliament with phases (Nehru, Indira, coalition, post-2014); critique and reform proposals (more sitting days, mandatory committee scrutiny, time limits for presidential assent, independent Speaker); conclusion.

Keywords: constitutional head, aid and advice, prime-ministerial government, ordinance raj, decline of Parliament, committee scrutiny, executive dominance, collective responsibility.

Quotation: Bagehot called the cabinet the efficient secret of the English constitution.

Reform anchor: the NCRWC (2002) recommended a minimum number of sitting days for Parliament (120 for the Lok Sabha and 100 for the Rajya Sabha), a useful point for reform suggestions.

1. Envisaged Role

Guardian of the Constitution: the Court interprets the Constitution, protects Fundamental Rights through Article 32, and keeps the Union and states within their powers.

Austin's view: Granville Austin described the judiciary as an arm of the social revolution, meant to uphold the equality that Indians had long been denied.

Independence safeguards: security of tenure (removal only by a special majority of both Houses for proved misbehaviour or incapacity, Article 124(4)), salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund, bar on practice after retirement, power to punish for contempt (Article 129), and control over its own staff.

Integrated judiciary: unlike the US, India has one hierarchy of courts with the Supreme Court at the top, and its law binds all courts (Article 141).

2. Jurisdiction

Original (Article 131): disputes between the Union and states or between states.

Writ (Article 32): enforcement of Fundamental Rights by habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto.

Appellate (Articles 132–134) and special leave (Article 136): the special leave petition has become the main route to the Court and the main source of its heavy docket.

Advisory (Article 143): the President may seek its opinion, as in In re Kerala Education Bill (1958), the Berubari reference (1960) and the Third Judges reference (1998); in the Ayodhya reference the Court declined to answer (Ismail Faruqui, 1994).

Complete justice (Article 142): the Court may pass any order necessary for complete justice, used in the Union Carbide settlement (1991), in Vishaka (1997) and in the Ayodhya judgment (2019).

Review and curative petitions: Article 137 allows review; the curative petition was created by the Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra (2002) as a final remedy against gross miscarriage of justice.

3. Appointments and Judicial Independence

Text: Article 124(2) says judges are appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice and other judges as the President thinks necessary.

First Judges case (1981): in S.P. Gupta v Union of India the Court held that consultation did not mean concurrence, giving the executive primacy.

Second Judges case (1993): the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association case created the collegium, giving primacy to the Chief Justice and senior judges; the Third Judges case (1998) fixed the collegium as the Chief Justice and four senior-most judges.

NJAC case (2015): the 99th Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission were struck down as violating judicial independence, restoring the collegium.

Executive interference in the past: the supersession of senior judges in 1973 and 1977 and the transfer of judges during the Emergency are cited as reasons why the Court took control of appointments.

Critique of the collegium: lack of transparency, absence of written criteria, under-representation of women and certain groups, and delays caused by disagreements with the government over the Memorandum of Procedure.

4. Actual Working: Activism and Public Interest Litigation

Emergency and after: in ADM Jabalpur (1976) the Court held that the right to approach courts for habeas corpus stood suspended during the Emergency, with Justice H.R. Khanna dissenting; its later turn to public interest litigation is often read as an effort to regain legitimacy.

PIL: led by Justices P.N. Bhagwati and V.R. Krishna Iyer, the Court relaxed standing (S.P. Gupta, 1981) and accepted letters as petitions; cases on undertrials (Hussainara Khatoon, 1979) and bonded labour (Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 1984) followed.

Environmental governance: M.C. Mehta cases (Ganga pollution, Delhi vehicles moving to CNG), T.N. Godavarman (forests, from 1995) and the polluter pays principle.

Continuing mandamus and guidelines: Vineet Narain (1998) on CBI independence, Vishaka (1997) on sexual harassment at the workplace, Prakash Singh (2006) on police reforms, and D.K. Basu (1997) on arrest procedures.

Rights and electoral reform: disclosure of candidates' criminal and financial background (Association for Democratic Reforms, 2002), NOTA (PUCL, 2013), and striking down the electoral bonds scheme (February 2024) for violating voters' right to information.

Upholding executive choices: the Court has also deferred to the government in major cases, such as upholding the abrogation of Article 370's special status (December 2023) and the demonetisation decision (January 2023).

5. Problems and Critiques

Overreach: critics such as Pratap Bhanu Mehta argue that the Court governs through orders on policy matters, blurring the separation of powers; the liquor ban near highways (2016) is often cited as an example.

Pendency: tens of thousands of cases in the Supreme Court and several crore across all courts; much of the Supreme Court's time goes to special leave petitions rather than constitutional questions.

Constitution benches: important constitutional cases can wait years for larger benches, which undermines the Court's role as a constitutional court.

Master of the roster: in January 2018 four senior judges held a press conference questioning the allocation of cases by the Chief Justice, an unprecedented public dissent from within.

Accountability: impeachment has never succeeded; the Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968 and in-house procedures are criticised as weak, and post-retirement appointments raise questions of independence.

Polyvocality: scholars describe the Court as polyvocal, many benches of two or three judges sometimes giving inconsistent rulings.

6. Theories and Debates

Least dangerous branch: Hamilton (Federalist 78) and Bickel (1962) frame the debate on the legitimacy of judicial power.

Judicial activism versus restraint: activism protects the voiceless when other branches fail; restraint protects democratic choice; the Indian Court moves between the two depending on the issue and the political climate.

Upendra Baxi: his work, including The Indian Supreme Court and Politics (1980) and later writings on social action litigation, analyses the Court as a political actor.

Transformative constitutionalism: recent judgments (Navtej Johar, 2018; Puttaswamy, 2017) present the Constitution as a tool for transforming an unequal society, extending Austin's idea of the social revolution.

7. Indian Context and Reforms

Reform proposals: a regional cassation bench or a national court of appeal (suggested by the Law Commission), a transparent Memorandum of Procedure for appointments, fixed timelines for constitution bench cases, and filling of vacancies.

Technology: live-streaming of constitution bench hearings (since 2022), e-filing and neutral citations aim to make the Court more open.

Federal umpire: Union-state disputes have returned to the Court, for example on the Governor's role in assent to bills and on the control of services in Delhi (2023).

8. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: state the envisaged role, give two examples of actual working (one activist, one problem), and conclude on balance.

20-mark answer: introduction with Austin's arm of the social revolution; body on independence and appointments, jurisdiction, PIL and activism with cases, then critiques (overreach, pendency, accountability); conclusion on the need for judicial reform without weakening independence.

Keywords: guardian of the Constitution, collegium, judicial independence, PIL, continuing mandamus, Article 142, judicial overreach, transformative constitutionalism.

Quotation: Hamilton described the judiciary as having neither force nor will, but merely judgment.

Quotation (paraphrase): Justice Khanna, dissenting in ADM Jabalpur, held that the sanctity of life and liberty does not depend on the Constitution alone and could not be suspended by an executive order.

1. Core Ideas

Mirror structure: Part VI of the Constitution (Articles 152–237) creates a parliamentary system in the states similar to the Union, within a federal framework where the Union has overriding powers.

Envisaged role versus actual working: the key questions are whether the Governor acts as a constitutional head, whether state legislatures deliberate effectively, and whether High Courts protect rights and federal balance.

Federal significance: the working of state institutions is the main test of Indian federalism, which K.C. Wheare called quasi-federal.

2. The Governor: Envisaged Role

Appointment and tenure: appointed by the President (Article 155) and holds office during the pleasure of the President (Article 156), normally for five years.

Constitutional head: executive power of the state is vested in the Governor (Article 154), exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister (Article 163), except where the Constitution requires discretion.

Areas of discretion: reserving bills for the President (Article 200, 201), reporting on the failure of constitutional machinery (Article 356), special responsibilities under Article 371 and the Sixth Schedule, and choosing a Chief Minister when no party has a clear majority.

Assembly debate: the Assembly chose an appointed Governor over an elected one to avoid rivalry with the Chief Minister; Ambedkar described the Governor's role as largely formal, with no functions he could discharge by himself (paraphrase).

3. The Governor: Actual Working

Agent of the Centre: Governors have often been seen as acting on the wishes of the ruling party at the Union, especially in recommending President's Rule and in inviting parties to form governments.

Article 356: used more than a hundred times since 1950, frequently against opposition-ruled states, for example the dismissal of nine state governments in 1977 and again in 1980.

Bommai case (1994): the Supreme Court held that the proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review, the majority must be tested on the floor of the House, and secularism is a basic feature.

Rameshwar Prasad (2006): the dissolution of the Bihar assembly in 2005 on the Governor's report was held unconstitutional.

Singhal case (2010): although the Governor holds office at the President's pleasure, removal cannot be arbitrary or merely because of a change of government at the Centre.

Nabam Rebia (2016): the Arunachal Pradesh Governor's advancing of the assembly session on his own was held unconstitutional; the Governor's discretion is limited.

Delay on bills: in State of Punjab v Principal Secretary to the Governor (November 2023) the Court held that a Governor cannot sit on bills indefinitely; in State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025) it set timelines for action on bills and treated ten long-pending bills as having received assent.

Presidential reference (2025): following the Tamil Nadu judgment, the President sought the Supreme Court's advisory opinion under Article 143 on timelines for Governors and the President in dealing with bills.

4. Commissions on the Governor and Centre-State Relations

Administrative Reforms Commission (1966–70) and Rajamannar Committee (1969): the latter, set up by Tamil Nadu, sought greater state autonomy and limits on Article 356.

Sarkaria Commission (report 1988): the Governor should be an eminent person from outside the state, not active in politics recently, appointed after consulting the Chief Minister; Article 356 should be used sparingly as a last resort.

Punchhi Commission (report 2010): recommended fixed five-year tenure for Governors, removal only by a resolution of the state legislature, and a time limit for decisions on bills.

NCRWC (2002): also advised a fixed tenure and consultation with the Chief Minister.

5. Chief Minister and Council of Ministers

Envisaged role: the Chief Minister heads the Council of Ministers (Article 164), which is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly; the 91st Amendment (2003) caps the ministry at 15 percent of the assembly's strength, with a minimum of twelve.

Actual working: the Chief Minister dominates the state government, often more than the Prime Minister dominates the Union, especially in regional parties built around a single leader.

High command culture: in national parties, Chief Ministers have often been chosen or replaced by the central leadership, weakening the assembly's role.

Ordinances in states: Article 213 gives the Governor ordinance power; the D.C. Wadhwa case (1987) exposed the re-promulgation of ordinances in Bihar over many years.

6. State Legislature

Structure: Legislative Assembly in all states; Legislative Councils in six states (Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra and Karnataka); Article 169 allows Parliament to create or abolish a council on a resolution of the assembly passed by special majority.

Weak upper house: a Legislative Council can only delay ordinary bills (up to three months on first passage and one month on second) and money bills (fourteen days), so it is a revising and advisory chamber.

Debate on councils: supporters see them as forums for teachers, graduates and experts; critics call them costly and a way to accommodate defeated politicians, which explains their abolition in some states.

Actual working: state assemblies meet for few days a year, many bills pass with little debate, and committees are weaker than in Parliament.

Speaker and defection: Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) asked Speakers to decide disqualification petitions within three months; Subhash Desai (2023), arising from the Maharashtra crisis, held that the Governor erred in calling a floor test without objective material and clarified the roles of the Speaker and party.

7. High Courts

Structure: Article 214 provides a High Court for each state; there are 25 High Courts, some shared by more than one state or Union Territory.

Writ jurisdiction (Article 226): wider than Article 32, since High Courts can issue writs for Fundamental Rights and for any other purpose, such as enforcing statutory rights.

Superintendence (Article 227): power over all subordinate courts and tribunals in their territory; L. Chandra Kumar (1997) held that High Court review of tribunal decisions is part of the basic structure.

Appointment and transfer: judges are appointed under Article 217 through the collegium system; transfers under Article 222 are recommended by the Supreme Court collegium.

Actual working: High Courts have delivered important rights and federal rulings, but face high vacancies, heavy pendency and delays; access to justice in remote areas is limited, which has led to demands for more benches.

8. Using It in the Exam

10-mark answer: state the envisaged role of the Governor with articles, give two examples of deviation, cite one court ruling and one commission recommendation.

20-mark answer: introduction on the mirror structure and federal context; body on the Governor (envisaged versus actual, Bommai, Nabam Rebia, Punjab and Tamil Nadu cases), the Chief Minister and assembly, and High Courts; reforms from Sarkaria and Punchhi; conclusion on cooperative federalism.

Keywords: constitutional head, discretion, agent of the Centre, floor test, Article 356, Sarkaria Commission, deemed assent, cooperative federalism.

Quotation: in S.R. Bommai, the Court held that the floor of the House is the only proper place to test a government's majority (principle, not exact words).

Quotation (paraphrase): Ambedkar hoped that Article 356 would remain a dead letter and be used only as a last resort.