Internal Security — UPSC Science & Tech Notes

1. Concepts

Extremism: holding radical views and being ready to use or justify violence to achieve political, religious or ideological goals. Insurgency is an organised armed movement against the state; terrorism uses violence against civilians to spread fear.

Relative deprivation theory (Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 1970): violence grows when the gap between what people expect and what they get becomes intolerable — not only absolute poverty but perceived injustice.

Development can both reduce extremism (jobs, services, voice) and cause it when it is exclusionary — mines, dams and industries that displace people without fair compensation or consent.

2. How Development Deficits Feed Extremism

Land and forests: land alienation of tribals, weak land reforms, denial of traditional forest rights, and displacement by mining in Fifth Schedule areas.

Governance deficit: no schools, health centres, roads, banks or courts in remote areas; corrupt and insensitive local officials; poor implementation of welfare schemes.

Economic: unemployment among educated youth, exploitation by moneylenders and contractors, minor forest produce sold at low prices.

Identity and alienation: ethnic and cultural fears in the North-East, or a sense of political alienation in Jammu and Kashmir, which external actors amplify.

3. Official Diagnoses

Planning Commission Expert Group (2008) on 'Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas' (chaired by D. Bandyopadhyay) linked LWE to land alienation, displacement, forest-rights denial and poor governance.

Second ARC, 7th Report (2008), 'Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution', stressed land reforms, PESA implementation and responsive administration.

4. Legal and Judicial Safeguards

PESA Act, 1996 (gram sabha powers over land, minor forest produce and minerals in Fifth Schedule areas) and the Forest Rights Act, 2006.

Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997): transfer of tribal land in Scheduled Areas to private mining firms held void. Niyamgiri case (Orissa Mining Corporation v. MoEF, 2013): gram sabhas allowed to decide on bauxite mining affecting their religious and cultural rights.

RFCTLARR Act, 2013 requires consent, social impact assessment and fair compensation in land acquisition; District Mineral Foundations (2015) return part of mining revenue to affected areas.

5. Development as a Counter-Strategy

Road and mobile-tower connectivity in remote areas, banking and post offices, Eklavya Model Residential Schools, skill centres, Aspirational Districts Programme (2018) and Special Central Assistance to the worst-affected districts.

Sequencing: security forces first 'clear and hold' an area, then development agencies 'build'; civic action programmes by CAPFs win trust.

6. Limits of the Development Argument

Extremist groups often block development (blowing up roads, schools and towers) because it weakens their hold; they also extort from contractors.

Poverty alone does not explain terrorism — many radicalised individuals are educated and middle class; ideology, identity and external sponsorship also matter.

Practice

UPSC-style (Mains): 'Development and the spread of extremism are two sides of the same coin.' Examine with reference to Left Wing Extremism in India.

1. Meaning

State actors: governments and their agencies (army, intelligence services) that sponsor violence or subversion in another country, usually through proxies to keep plausible deniability.

Non-state actors: organisations not part of any government — terror outfits, insurgent groups, criminal syndicates, hawala operators, radical preachers and online networks, and NGOs misused as fronts.

The line between them is blurred: state agencies arm and shelter non-state groups, which then act as force multipliers in a 'war by a thousand cuts'.

2. Western Front

Pakistan-based groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have carried out major attacks (Parliament 2001, Mumbai 2008, Pulwama 2019, Pahalgam 2025); infiltration, funding and propaganda sustain militancy in Jammu and Kashmir.

Punjab: drones drop drugs and weapons across the border; Khalistani separatist elements in some Western countries try to revive militancy through propaganda and targeted violence.

Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) printed abroad and pushed through Nepal and Bangladesh routes to fund terror and damage the economy.

3. Eastern and Northern Fronts

North-East insurgents have long used camps in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan; Bhutan's Operation All Clear (2003) flushed out ULFA, NDFB and KLO camps, and Bangladesh handed over several ULFA leaders after 2009.

Instability in Myanmar after the 2021 coup, the free movement of people and the Golden Triangle drug trade affect Manipur and Mizoram.

China is reported to have supported North-East insurgents in the past (1960s–70s); today concerns centre on cyber attacks, influence operations, and Chinese-origin weapons reaching insurgents through Myanmar.

4. Tools Used by External Actors

Infiltration and cross-border terror; training camps and safe havens; arms, drugs and FICN smuggling; hawala and crypto funding; online radicalisation and disinformation; cyber attacks on critical infrastructure; exploitation of ethnic and religious faultlines.

5. India's Responses

Military: surgical strikes (2016) after Uri, Balakot air strike (2019) after Pulwama, and Operation Sindoor (May 2025) after Pahalgam; a 2015 cross-border operation against NSCN(K) militants in Myanmar after the Chandel ambush.

Diplomatic and financial: UNSC 1267 listings, FATF pressure, bilateral counter-terrorism dialogues, extradition and intelligence-sharing agreements; in April 2025 India put the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance after Pahalgam.

Domestic: border fencing and technology, UAPA and NIA, FCRA scrutiny of foreign funding, cyber and social media monitoring, and engagement with the diaspora.

6. Challenges

Deniability makes attribution hard; safe havens lie beyond India's jurisdiction; technology (encrypted apps, drones, crypto) lowers the cost of attacks; global consensus on defining terrorism is absent (CCIT stalled).

Practice

UPSC-style (Mains): Analyse the multidimensional challenges posed by external state and non-state actors to the internal security of India, and suggest measures to counter them.

1. Why the Region Is Vulnerable

Geography: hilly, forested terrain; porous borders with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China; the Siliguri 'Chicken's Neck' is only about 20–22 km wide at its narrowest.

Diversity and identity: more than 200 ethnic groups; fears of losing land and culture to migrants (the basis of the Assam Movement, 1979–85); competing homeland claims among Nagas, Kukis and Meiteis.

Development and governance gaps: poor connectivity, few jobs, extortion economies run by armed groups ('taxation'), and drug and arms flows from the Golden Triangle.

2. Major Insurgencies

Naga: Naga National Council under A.Z. Phizo (declared independence 1947); NSCN (1980) later split into NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K). Ceasefire with NSCN(IM) since 1997 and a Framework Agreement (3 August 2015); talks are stuck on the demand for a separate Naga flag and constitution.

Mizo: the Mizo National Front revolt (1966) ended with the Mizo Accord (1986) — the most successful accord, as the rebels joined electoral politics and Mizoram became a State (1987).

Assam: ULFA (1979) fought for a sovereign Assam; Bodo groups demanded a separate state; Karbi and Dimasa groups sought autonomy.

Tripura (NLFT, ATTF) and Manipur (valley-based groups such as UNLF and PLA; Kuki and Naga groups in the hills).

3. Peace Accords since 2019

NLFT(SD) (August 2019); Bru-Reang agreement (January 2020) for permanent settlement of Bru families in Tripura; Bodo Accord (27 January 2020) creating the Bodoland Territorial Region; Karbi Anglong Agreement (September 2021).

Inter-state border: Assam–Meghalaya agreement (March 2022) settled six of twelve disputed areas; Assam–Arunachal 'Namsai Declaration' (July 2022), followed by the final Assam–Arunachal border agreement (April 2023).

UNLF (Manipur's oldest valley-based group) signed a peace agreement on 29 November 2023; pro-talks ULFA signed a Memorandum of Settlement on 29 December 2023 and disbanded in January 2024; NLFT and ATTF signed an agreement on 4 September 2024 (Tripura).

The ULFA faction led by Paresh Baruah (ULFA-I) and some Naga and Manipur valley groups remain outside the peace process.

4. AFSPA

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 applies in areas declared 'disturbed'; it allows the armed forces to search, arrest without warrant and use force, with prosecution only after Central sanction (Section 6).

Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (1997): the Supreme Court upheld AFSPA but laid down do's and don'ts. The Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005) recommended repeal; the 2nd ARC suggested folding it into the UAPA. Since April 2022 the Centre has steadily reduced disturbed areas in Assam, Nagaland and Manipur; Tripura (2015) and Meghalaya (2018) are free of it.

5. Manipur Conflict (2023 onwards)

Violence broke out on 3 May 2023 between the valley-based Meitei and hill-based Kuki-Zo communities after protests over the demand for Scheduled Tribe status for Meiteis; more than 250 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced, and the state became divided into ethnic buffer zones.

Issues: looting of police armouries, drug (poppy) economy, Myanmar refugee inflows, and distrust of security forces. President's Rule was imposed in February 2025 and revoked on 4 February 2026, when a new elected government took office.

Border policy: in February 2024 the Centre decided to end the Free Movement Regime (which let border residents move about 16 km across the India–Myanmar border without visas) and to fence the roughly 1,643 km border; Mizoram and Nagaland objected because of cross-border ethnic ties.

6. Way Forward

Complete the Naga talks with a solution acceptable to neighbouring states; implement accords in time (funds, autonomy councils); reconciliation and disarmament in Manipur; Act East connectivity; phased withdrawal of AFSPA as normalcy returns.

Practice

UPSC-style (Mains): Peace accords have reduced insurgency in the North-East, but lasting peace depends on their implementation. Discuss with examples.

1. Constitutional Changes of 2019

Constitutional Order 272 (5 August 2019) applied the whole Constitution to J&K; Article 370 became inoperative and Article 35A (special rights of permanent residents) ceased.

J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 (in force from 31 October 2019) created the UTs of Jammu and Kashmir (with legislature) and Ladakh (without legislature).

New domicile rules (2020) opened government jobs and land purchase to more residents; the Delimitation Commission (2022) raised Assembly seats from 83 to 90 (Jammu 43, Kashmir 47).

2. Judicial and Political Milestones

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (January 2020): internet shutdowns must be necessary, proportionate, temporary and open to review.

In re Article 370 (11 December 2023): a five-judge bench unanimously upheld the abrogation, held that Article 370 was a temporary provision, ordered Assembly elections by 30 September 2024 and restoration of statehood 'at the earliest'.

Assembly elections (September–October 2024), the first in a decade, saw high turnout; Omar Abdullah became Chief Minister of the UT in October 2024. Statehood remained pending as of October 2026; the Assembly passed a resolution seeking it in September 2026.

3. Security Trends

Improvements: organised stone-pelting and hartals largely ended; local recruitment into militancy fell; tourism and investment rose; separatist groups and their funding networks were targeted by NIA and ED cases.

New patterns: 'hybrid' militants (unlisted persons used for single attacks), targeted killings of minorities and migrant workers, new proxy fronts (e.g. TRF, PAFF) to disguise LeT and JeM, and a shift of attacks to the forested Pir Panjal–Jammu belt (Rajouri, Poonch, Kathua, Doda) by small groups of foreign terrorists.

Narco-terror and drones: drones drop weapons and drugs along the International Border; the June 2021 drone attack on the Jammu Air Force Station was the first of its kind in India.

4. Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor

On 22 April 2025 terrorists killed 26 people, mostly tourists, at Baisaran near Pahalgam. India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance and, on 7 May 2025, launched Operation Sindoor, striking terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir; hostilities ended with an understanding on 10 May 2025.

The attack aimed to hurt tourism, the return to normalcy and communal harmony; the local public protest against it was notable.

5. Security Architecture

Army (counter-infiltration on the LoC; Rashtriya Rifles in the hinterland), BSF on the International Border, CRPF and J&K Police in urban areas, Unified Headquarters for coordination, and Village Defence Guards in remote Jammu villages.

Outreach: Operation Sadbhavana (Army civic action), HIMAYAT skilling, sports and education programmes, and the Amarnath Yatra security grid.

6. Way Forward

Restore statehood as promised, strengthen elected institutions, prevent alienation through jobs and dignity, sustain counter-infiltration and intelligence in the Jammu region, and keep up diplomatic and financial pressure on terror sponsors.

Practice

UPSC-style (Mains): Assess the changing nature of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir after 2019 and suggest a strategy to consolidate peace.

1. Key Terms

Radicalisation: a gradual shift towards extreme beliefs. Violent extremism: supporting or using violence for those beliefs. Not every radical becomes violent.

Counter-radicalisation: preventing people from being radicalised (education, counter-narratives). De-radicalisation: helping already radicalised people give up extremist beliefs. Disengagement: leaving violence even if beliefs remain.

2. Drivers

Push factors: perceived injustice and discrimination, communal violence, unemployment, poor governance, identity crisis and alienation.

Pull factors: charismatic recruiters, a sense of belonging and purpose, glorified ideology, money, adventure and online echo chambers.

Online radicalisation: algorithms push users to more extreme content; encrypted apps, gaming platforms and short videos help recruiters reach youth directly; lone-actor attacks need little organisation.

3. Forms of Radicalisation in India

Religious extremism (cross-border jihadist groups, ISIS-inspired modules, and majoritarian vigilante violence), separatist ethno-nationalism, Left-wing extremism (Maoist ideology), and caste-based militias in the past.

Relatively few Indians joined ISIS compared with many other countries, which is often credited to India's pluralist traditions, family networks and early intervention by police.

Organisational bans: the Popular Front of India (PFI) and its affiliates were declared an 'unlawful association' under the UAPA in September 2022 for five years.

4. De-radicalisation Approaches

Indian practice: state police (e.g. Maharashtra, Kerala, Telangana) counsel youth flagged online, involving parents, religious scholars and psychologists instead of immediate arrest; surrender-cum-rehabilitation policies for militants and Maoists; Army's Operation Sadbhavana and skilling schemes such as HIMAYAT in J&K.

Global models: Singapore's Religious Rehabilitation Group (clerics counsel detainees), Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation centres (counselling, family support, jobs), the UK's Prevent strategy (early referral; criticised for stigmatising communities).

Prisons: jails can become recruitment hubs; separating hardcore ideologues and offering counselling, education and work inside prisons is essential.

5. Challenges

No national framework or dedicated agency; policing of online content is reactive; risk of stigmatising whole communities; low trust between police and youth; shortage of trained counsellors; communal polarisation feeding rival radicalisations.

6. Way Forward

A national counter- and de-radicalisation policy with state flexibility; community policing; partnerships with platforms to remove extremist content; counter-narratives by credible voices (religious leaders, former militants, sportspersons); critical-thinking and digital literacy in schools; equal and prompt justice in communal violence cases.

Practice

UPSC-style (Mains): What are the drivers of online radicalisation among youth? Suggest a framework for de-radicalisation suited to Indian conditions.

1. Media as a Security Asset

Early warning and public alerts in disasters and attacks; exposing corruption and human-rights abuses that cause alienation; building national resilience and counter-narratives; open-source intelligence (OSINT) for agencies.

2. Threats

Live coverage of operations: during 26/11 (2008), TV visuals helped handlers in Pakistan guide the attackers; the Supreme Court in the Ajmal Kasab judgment (2012) criticised this. The Cable TV programme code was amended to bar live coverage of anti-terror operations, allowing only periodic briefings by an officer.

Misinformation and hate: WhatsApp rumours of child-lifters led to mob lynchings (2017–18); doctored videos have triggered communal riots (e.g. Muzaffarnagar, 2013). In Tehseen Poonawalla (2018) the Supreme Court issued guidelines against mob lynching.

Terror propaganda and recruitment through encrypted apps and video platforms; coordinated influence operations by hostile states using bots and fake accounts, especially during conflicts and elections.

Deepfakes: AI-generated audio and video can impersonate leaders or officers, fake a terror threat, spark panic or communal violence, enable fraud ('digital arrest' scams) and harass women with non-consensual imagery.

3. Legal Framework

IT Act, 2000: Section 69A (blocking of content in the interest of sovereignty, security and public order; upheld in Shreya Singhal, 2015, which struck down Section 66A); Section 79 (safe harbour for intermediaries that follow due diligence).

IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: grievance officers, takedown on orders, and for significant social media intermediaries a resident compliance officer and identification of the 'first originator' of messages (challenged in court by WhatsApp).

Synthetic content amendment (notified 10 February 2026, in force 20 February 2026): defines 'synthetically generated information', requires platforms to label AI-generated content and attach provenance metadata, and cuts the time to act on government or court takedown orders to 3 hours.

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Section 197 penalises making or publishing false or misleading information that jeopardises the sovereignty, unity, integrity or security of India; Section 196 covers promoting enmity between groups.

Internet shutdowns: now governed by Section 20 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023; Anuradha Bhasin (2020) requires them to be necessary, proportionate, temporary and reviewable.

4. Institutions and Court Checks

PIB Fact Check Unit (2019) flags false news about the Central government; a 2023 amendment giving a government fact-check unit power to force removal was struck down by the Bombay High Court in September 2024 (Kunal Kamra case).

Sahyog portal (I4C, MHA) lets authorised agencies send unlawful-content notices to platforms; in September 2025 a single judge of the Karnataka High Court rejected X Corp's challenge to it, and X has appealed.

State police social media monitoring cells, the Election Commission's action against fake content during polls, and platform self-regulation.

5. Challenges and Way Forward

Balancing free speech with security; encryption versus traceability; speed of virality versus slow takedown; detection of deepfakes; over-blocking and opaque orders.

Way forward: digital and media literacy campaigns, independent fact-checkers, transparent and reasoned blocking orders, watermarking and detection tools for AI content, a code for live reporting during operations, and quick official communication to beat rumours.

Practice

UPSC-style (Mains): Social media has become a force multiplier for both the state and anti-state elements. Discuss, with reference to deepfakes and misinformation.

1. Stages of Money Laundering

Placement: putting illegal cash into the financial system (deposits split into small amounts — 'smurfing', casinos, cash businesses).

Layering: hiding the trail through many transactions — shell companies, trade mis-invoicing, offshore accounts, crypto-assets.

Integration: bringing the money back as apparently legitimate wealth — real estate, luxury goods, investments.

2. Sources of Terror Financing

State sponsorship; hawala (informal value transfer without moving money across borders); Fake Indian Currency Notes; drug trafficking (narco-terror); extortion and 'taxation' by insurgents and Maoists; misuse of charities and NGOs; crowdfunding, online wallets and crypto-assets; legitimate businesses used as fronts.

Terror attacks are cheap, so even small amounts matter; the aim is to track the network ('follow the money'), not just the sum.

3. Legal Framework

PMLA, 2002 (in force 2005): offence of money laundering linked to 'scheduled offences'; attachment and confiscation of 'proceeds of crime'; reporting duties for banks, financial institutions and intermediaries; Adjudicating Authority and Appellate Tribunal.

Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022): the Supreme Court upheld ED's powers of arrest, search and attachment, the twin conditions for bail and the reverse burden of proof; held that the ED is not 'police' and the ECIR is not an FIR.

UAPA, 1967: Section 17 punishes raising funds for a terrorist act; property derived from terrorism can be attached. Other laws: FEMA, 1999, FCRA, 2010, Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018, Black Money Act, 2015, NDPS Act.

Since 2023, virtual digital asset service providers (crypto exchanges) are 'reporting entities' under PMLA and must register with FIU-IND.

4. Institutions

Enforcement Directorate (Department of Revenue) — investigates PMLA and FEMA cases. FIU-IND (2004) — receives and analyses suspicious and cash transaction reports and shares intelligence. NIA's Terror Funding and Fake Currency (TFFC) cell; DRI, CBDT, RBI and SEBI as regulators.

5. FATF and the Global Regime

Financial Action Task Force: set up by the G7 in Paris in 1989; issues the 40 Recommendations; maintains the 'black list' (call for action) and 'grey list' (increased monitoring). India became a full member in 2010.

India's Mutual Evaluation (adopted June 2024, published September 2024): 'regular follow-up' category; rated compliant or largely compliant on 37 of 40 Recommendations, but asked to speed up prosecutions and improve oversight of non-profits. India's next full evaluation is due in 2031.

Pakistan was on the FATF grey list from 2018 to October 2022. India hosted the third 'No Money for Terror' ministerial conference in New Delhi in November 2022.

6. Challenges and Way Forward

Low conviction rates and long trials under PMLA; concerns about misuse and stringent bail; hawala and cash economy; crypto and cross-border digital payments; misuse of NGOs; weak coordination between agencies.

Way forward: special courts and trained prosecutors, data analytics linking FIU, tax and banking data, regulation of virtual assets, risk-based (not blanket) oversight of non-profits, and international cooperation on asset recovery.

Practice

UPSC-style (Prelims): Consider: 1. FIU-IND functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs. 2. Crypto exchanges are reporting entities under the PMLA. Which is/are correct? (Answer: 2 only — FIU-IND is under the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance.)

1. Why Coastal Security Matters

Long coastline with 9 coastal States, 4 coastal UTs (including the island territories) and over 1,300 islands; major ports, refineries, nuclear plants and offshore oil platforms (Mumbai High) near the coast; heavy fishing and merchant traffic that is hard to monitor.

Threats: sea-borne terrorism (1993 Mumbai blasts used RDX landed on the Raigad coast; 26/11 attackers came by a hijacked fishing trawler), smuggling of drugs, arms, gold and fake currency, illegal migration, piracy, and attacks on offshore assets.

Large drug seizures at sea and at ports (e.g. Mundra port, 2021) show the coast's use for narco-trafficking from the Golden Crescent.

2. The Multi-Layered Structure (after 2009)

Indian Navy: designated authority for overall maritime security, including coastal and offshore security; runs Joint Operations Centres (Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi, Port Blair) and raised the Sagar Prahari Bal with fast interception craft.

Indian Coast Guard (1978, Ministry of Defence): additionally responsible for coastal security in territorial waters, including coordination with the Centre and States; patrols the Maritime Zones of India.

State marine police: patrol shallow waters close to the coast through coastal police stations set up under the Coastal Security Scheme (Phase I from 2005, Phase II from 2011), with boats, jetties and check-posts.

Other stakeholders: Customs, port authorities, CISF at ports, fisheries departments, Intelligence Bureau and the Directorate General of Shipping.

3. Surveillance and Information Fusion

Coastal Radar Chain: radar stations along the mainland coast and islands, linked with Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers; extended to friendly neighbours (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles).

NC3I network (National Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) links Navy and Coast Guard stations; its hub is the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) at Gurugram.

Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), set up in 2018 at Gurugram, shares maritime domain awareness with partner countries and hosts international liaison officers.

Fishing boats: registration, colour coding, transponders on boats, and biometric ID cards for fishermen, since fishermen are the 'eyes and ears' of coastal security.

4. Coordination and Exercises

National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS), chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, reviews coastal security; a National Maritime Security Coordinator post was created in the National Security Council Secretariat in 2022.

Exercises: Sagar Kavach (regular coastal security drills by States with Navy and Coast Guard) and Sea Vigil (pan-India coastal defence exercise led by the Navy, first held in 2019).

5. Gaps and Way Forward

State marine police are short of trained staff and boat maintenance; many personnel are reluctant to serve at sea; multiple agencies with overlapping roles; no single coastal security law; small boats below 20 m are hard to track.

Way forward: a dedicated coastal police cadre or a central coastal force, a maritime security law and a National Maritime Security Strategy, satellite-based tracking of small craft, port security audits, and deeper regional information sharing under SAGAR / MAHASAGAR.

Practice

UPSC-style (Mains): Despite the post-26/11 reforms, India's coastal security remains a weak link in internal security. Critically examine.

1. Hybrid Warfare

Combines military and non-military tools — proxies and terror groups, cyber attacks, information operations, lawfare, economic coercion and 'grey-zone' actions (e.g. maritime militias) — to weaken an adversary without triggering full war.

Global examples: Russia's operations in Crimea (2014) mixed unmarked soldiers, cyber attacks and propaganda; attacks on Ukraine's power grid (2015) showed how cyber attacks can switch off civilian services.

For India: cross-border terror combined with propaganda, cyber intrusions into power and health systems (Mumbai power outage, October 2020, was linked by some researchers to state-backed hackers), and disinformation during conflicts such as Operation Sindoor (2025).

2. Drone Threats

Cross-border drops: drones from across the western border drop drugs, pistols, grenades and cash in Punjab and Jammu; the BSF recovers many such drones every year.

Attacks: the June 2021 drone attack on the Jammu Air Force Station was India's first; drone swarms and loitering munitions were used widely in the Ukraine and West Asia conflicts and in the India–Pakistan hostilities of May 2025.

Why dangerous: cheap, small, low-flying and hard to detect by conventional radar; can carry explosives, cameras or contraband; can target VIP events, refineries and crowds.

3. Counter-Drone Measures

Drone Rules, 2021: registration on the Digital Sky platform, airspace map with green, yellow and red zones, and remote pilot certificates; red zones (near borders and vital installations) need permission.

Technology: DRDO's Drone Detect, Deter and Destroy (D4) system using radar, RF detection, jamming and laser; anti-drone systems deployed by the BSF along the Punjab border; layered air defence and guns against larger drones.

4. Cyber Security Institutions

CERT-In (2004, MeitY): national nodal agency for cyber incident response under Section 70B of the IT Act; runs the National Cyber Coordination Centre (situational awareness) and the Cyber Swachhta Kendra (botnet cleaning and malware analysis).

NCIIPC (notified 2014, under NTRO): protects Critical Information Infrastructure (power, banking, telecom, transport, government, strategic enterprises) under Section 70A.

I4C (Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre, MHA): National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, helpline 1930, CyTrain training portal, joint cyber coordination teams for crime hotspots, and the Sahyog portal for takedown notices.

National Cyber Security Coordinator (in the National Security Council Secretariat) coordinates at the apex; the Defence Cyber Agency (2019) handles military cyber operations; sectoral CERTs exist for power and finance.

5. Challenges and Way Forward

Gaps: overlapping institutions, no updated national cyber security strategy since 2013, dependence on imported hardware, shortage of skilled personnel, weak state cyber police, and counter-drone systems that are costly and limited in range.

Way forward: a whole-of-nation doctrine on hybrid threats, an integrated cyber command, trusted supply chains, indigenous counter-drone technology for police and critical sites, and public awareness to blunt disinformation.

Practice

UPSC-style (Prelims): Which body protects India's Critical Information Infrastructure? (a) CERT-In (b) NCIIPC (c) I4C (d) NATGRID. (Answer: b.)

1. Constitutional Basis

Police and public order are State subjects (Entries 1 and 2, List II), but the Union may deploy armed forces and CAPFs in aid of the civil power (Entry 2A, List I, added by the 42nd Amendment).

Article 355: the Union must protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance; Article 352 (emergency on 'armed rebellion') and Article 356 are the extreme tools.

2. Apex Structure

Cabinet Committee on Security (chaired by the PM) takes final decisions; the National Security Council (1998) is advised by the National Security Advisor and served by the NSC Secretariat, the Strategic Policy Group and the National Security Advisory Board.

The Ministry of Home Affairs is the nodal ministry for internal security, controlling the CAPFs, IB, NIA, NCB, NSG and I4C.

3. Central Armed Police Forces

Border guarding forces: BSF (Pakistan and Bangladesh borders), ITBP (China border), SSB (Nepal and Bhutan borders), Assam Rifles (Myanmar border; operational control with the Army). Internal security: CRPF (counter-insurgency, LWE, riots; CoBRA and RAF units) and CISF (airports, metros, PSUs, ports).

NSG ('Black Cats', NSG Act 1986): federal counter-terrorism and anti-hijack force; after 26/11 regional hubs were set up (Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Hyderabad, and later Gandhinagar).

4. Intelligence Agencies

Intelligence Bureau (IB): India's internal intelligence agency (origins 1887), under MHA; runs the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), set up after the Kargil Review, for real-time sharing of terror intelligence with Subsidiary MACs in States.

Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (1968, Cabinet Secretariat): external intelligence. NTRO (2004): technical intelligence (satellite, signals, cyber). Defence Intelligence Agency (2002): military intelligence.

Intelligence agencies have no statutory charter; Parliament has no oversight committee for them, unlike the US and UK — a long-standing reform demand.

5. Investigative and Enforcement Agencies

NIA (NIA Act, 2008): investigates and prosecutes 'scheduled offences' (terrorism, UAPA, FICN, human trafficking, cyber terrorism, offences against Indians abroad after the 2019 amendment) anywhere in India without State consent; special NIA courts.

CBI (1963, under DoPT; DSPE Act, 1946) needs State consent for cases in a State; ED (PMLA, FEMA); NCB (1986, NDPS Act); DRI (smuggling).

6. Coordination Platforms

NATGRID: conceived after 26/11 to link databases (bank, travel, telecom, immigration, tax) so that authorised agencies can access them securely to track terror suspects; raises privacy and oversight concerns.

NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Centre), proposed in 2012, was shelved after States objected that it would infringe on their police powers.

7. Issues and Reforms

Low police–population ratio, vacancies and overwork; colonial-era police structure; political interference — addressed by the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh (2006) (State Security Commissions, fixed tenure for DGPs, separation of investigation from law and order); over-dependence on CAPFs by States; turf wars between agencies.

Practice

UPSC-style (Mains): Multiplicity of agencies is both a strength and a weakness of India's internal security architecture. Discuss and suggest reforms.